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Abstract
Between 1853 and 1856, the nativist and anti-Catholic Know-Nothing party became a
powerful political force in Louisiana despite the state‘s unique religious and political makeup.
This thesis studies the rise of the party in three regions of the state: New Orleans, the Sugar
Parishes, and North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes to show that the party gained popularity
in the state differently in different regions. In New Orleans, the party rejected anti-Catholicism
and adopted a stance against political corruption. In the Sugar Parishes, the Know-Nothings were
merely a continuation of the Whig Party under a new name. In North Louisiana and in the
Florida Parishes, the Know-Nothings supported anti-Catholicism and opposed the political
power of New Orleans. In each region, proponents saw the Know-Nothing party as a means to
advance their own agendas.

iii

Introduction
Eighteen years after they first challenged the dominance of the Democrats, the national
Whig Party was falling apart. The Northern and Southern arms of the party had squabbled for
nearly a decade over the future of slavery, and the one chance at unifying the wounded party died
with president and war hero Zachary Taylor. In the following presidential election, Taylor‘s
successor, Millard Fillmore, failed to earn the Whig nomination. Instead, the party nominated
Winfield Scott, who Democrat Franklin Pierce handily defeated. Whigs lost more than just the
presidency; Democrats unseated Whigs in congressional races in states across the country.
Voters simply had lost faith in the Whigs. The Whig Party continued to exist in local politics in
some corners of the country, but after 1852, Whigs ceased to pose a serious threat to the
Democrats in national politics.
Two years after the Whig defeat, the American Party held conventions, nominated
candidates to all strata of public offices, and gained enough national support to supplant the
Whigs as the primary alternative to Democratic rule. At a time when the country divided on
slavery‘s future, the new party found immediate, national success. Although sectional
disagreement over the expansion of slavery weakened the Whigs, the Americans avoided the
debate by deemphasizing the importance of the issue. For the American Party, a Catholic
conspiracy, not the spread of slavery, more immediately threatened American democracy. The
American Party‘s ability to divert the nation‘s attention from sectional divide proved short lived,
and in just five years after the Know-Nothings appeared, newer political parties replaced the
American Party as opponents to the Democrats. Still, from 1854 to 1856, the American Party
grew rapidly and seemed poised to overtake the Democrats.

1

In 1854, the American Party‘s profile grew in Louisiana with the decline of that state‘s
Whig Party. Americans held conventions and entered political races in every part of the state. By
the end of the year, voters in East Feliciana, Union, Morehouse, Iberville, and St. Landry
parishes as well as the city of New Orleans elected American Party candidates to government
positions. Over the next two years, the Americans won a majority of municipal elections in New
Orleans, Donaldsonville, Houma, and Baton Rouge. In New Orleans, the party became so
entrenched that it remained the dominant political party in municipal politics until Union forces
occupied the city during the Civil War, six years after the party‘s viability ceased elsewhere.
While the party outside of New Orleans floundered just two and a half years after it announced
its arrival into politics, the American Party in Louisiana persevered for nearly a decade.1
Historians disagree on why the nativist and anti-Catholic Know-Nothing Party gained
popularity in places where Catholic and Creole voters had long held political influence. Many
historians acknowledge that some Know-Nothings in Louisiana rebuked religious intolerance.
Some have noted that the American Party in Louisiana even attracted Catholics to its ranks.
Historian John Sacher argues that Catholics organized with the Know-Nothings because the state
party expressly rejected the anti-Catholic plank of the national party‘s platform. Sacher cites
party leader, Charles Gayarre‘s, address to the American Party convention where Gayarre
applauds the party‘s stance ―save for one rotten fragment,‖ religious intolerance. While this was
the case in New Orleans and in the Sugar Parishes, Sacher‘s argument overlooks the fact that
many Know-Nothings in North Louisiana did embrace the anti-Catholic plank. Historian Marius
Carriere argues that Catholic supporters of the American Party saw no conflict between their
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John M Sacher, A Perfect War of Politics: Parties, Politicians, and Democracy in Louisiana, 1824-1861
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003), 237, 256-258; W. Darrell Overdyke, The Know Nothing
Party in the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), 58-61.
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Catholicism and their political party. Carriere argues that the party feared that papal loyalty
undermined American Democracy, but American born Creole Catholics were anti-cleric and
maintained no loyalties to the Pope. The party in Louisiana, Carriere claims, stood against new,
immigrant Catholics, not the established Catholic population.2
Other historians suggest that the American Party grew rapidly in Louisiana because
former Whigs refused to support Democrats after the Whig decline. Although the party never
achieved a majority in statewide elections, the Know-Nothing Party garnered 46 percent of the
votes in the 1855 gubernatorial election, and 48 percent of the Louisiana vote in the presidential
election in 1856. Some claim that the party experienced instant popularity because they simply
absorbed the Whig Party‘s clout. Historian Michael Holt argues that the American Party in the
South was a ―vehicle for former Whigs to continue opposition to the Democrats‖ after the 1852
election. This was the same charge that contemporary Democrats levied against the KnowNothings. An 1854 edition of the Democrat newspaper, Raleigh Star, argued that the American
Party was ―Whiggery in disguise.‖ Historian W. Darrell Overdyke studies several newspapers
from across the region to show that after the party reached the South, many Whig publications
quickly warmed to the Know-Nothings while Democratic papers approached the new party with
suspicion. The historians also point out that the upstart American Party attracted more Whigs
than Democrats to their ranks.3
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For clarity, when I am discussing political parties, I will use Know-Nothing Party and American Party
interchangeably. Also, I choose to hyphenate ―Know-Nothing‖ rather than type it as ―Know Nothing,‖ as many
recent historians prefer, because the party‘s contemporaries almost universally hyphenate the term. Sacher, A Perfect
War of Politics, 273-242; Marius M. Carriere, Jr, ―Anti-Catholicism, Nativism, and Louisiana Politics in the 1850s,‖
Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 25, no. 4 (Autumn, 1994): 459-466.
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Sacher, A Perfect War of Politics, 307-310; Michael Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York:
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While the Know-Nothing Party in Louisiana indeed attracted more Whigs than
Democrats, some historians caution against assuming that the Whigs and Americans were the
same party. Michael Holt, in a later work, lists three reasons why conflating Southern Whigs and
Know-Nothings does not work: the Whig party continued to function as an independent party
(though a much weaker one) after the rise of the American Party, the South experienced genuine
nativist movements that strengthened the Know-Nothings, and Democrats, though in fewer
numbers than Whigs, joined the Know-Nothing party by the thousands. Some of the most
prominent Know-Nothings in Louisiana such as Charles Gayarre and J. H. Kilpatrick previously
ran as Democrats. Furthermore, some former Whigs who left the party after 1852 did not join the
Know-Nothings. Marius Carriere points out that after 1852, several former Whigs ran for
election as Democrats. The idea that the American Party was a continuation of Whiggery
originated in the partisan newspapers of the 1850‘s. Historians must recognize these sources as
political propaganda and approach them critically.4
Another historiographical argument is that the Know-Nothings became successful in
Louisiana because the party was part of a progressive reform movement. Know-Nothings sought
to control antebellum urbanization to protect their republican ideals. According to historian
Frank Towers, the party won a majority of aldermanic positions in New Orleans by campaigning
to erase budget deficits, stop vote fraud, and control the sale of liquor. For Towers, the party
sought urban moral and political reform in a time of unprecedented growth in American cities.

4

Michael Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the
Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 855-857; Marrius Carriere, ―The Know Nothing Movement
in Louisiana‖ (PhD diss, Louisiana State University, 1977), 96.
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The party‘s members believed themselves to be the prescription to the problem of corruption
caused by immigrant pauperism.5
Still other historians interpret the rise of the American Party in Louisiana as a
continuation of old ethnic rivalries that even predated the Second Party System. Ira Leonard and
Robert Parmet claim that the political rivalry between Democrats and Know-Nothings in
Louisiana continued a decades-old battle between Creoles and American natives (that is, English
speaking Protestants whose lineage in Louisiana postdated the Louisiana Purchase). The Creoles,
Parmet and Leonard argue, supported the Democrats while native born Americans supported the
Know-Nothings. The Creoles and Americans had fought for political dominance in Louisiana
since statehood, and the ethnic power struggle dominated state politics throughout the first half
of the nineteenth century. Sacher recounts that as late as 1846, a native American complained of
the rivalry; ―a creole [sic] always voted for a creole candidate at an election, however much he
differed from him in political opinions, rather than support an Anglo-Saxon of his own party.‖
Some historians argue that native born Americans adopted the American Party as their vehicle to
oppose Creole politics.6
Historians cannot reach consensus on deciphering the Louisiana Know-Nothing Party
because the party emphasized different political issues in different places. My research will show
that, from the time that the public first acknowledged the presence of the Know-Nothings in
Louisiana until the party ceased at the dawn of the Civil War, the American Party never
presented a cohesive party message in the state. I will argue that the party took on at least three
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Frank Towers, The Urban South and the Coming of the Civil War (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of
Virginia Press, 2004), 94-95.
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different faces in Louisiana. In New Orleans, the strongest faction of the party de-emphasized
anti-Catholicism and anti-immigration (to a degree) and instead emphasized election reform. In
the sugar-producing parishes along the Mississippi River, the Know-Nothings were little more
than a continuation of the Whigs: an opposition to the Democrats who advocated for the
American System, avoided slavery agitation, and dabbled in suppressing the immigrant vote. In
much of the remaining parts of the state, the party resembled the more traditional interpretation
of the Know-Nothingism; they were anti-Catholic nativists. The American Party‘s incongruence
in Louisiana demonstrates that the party was ultimately a vehicle for a variety of opportunistic
politicians to gain influence.
My study of the Know-Nothing Party in Louisiana depends heavily on newspapers
because these sources often acted as the voices of political parties. Louisiana newspapers in
1850‘s were hardly impartial, but rather most papers operated as an organ for one political party.
Newspapers reminded their readers which candidates to vote for in elections, and they provided
editorial commentary on the state of politics. Voters in Louisiana depended on the newspapers to
stay informed on politicians and issues before elections. When historians study the KnowNothings, the newspapers become even more important because the secret group failed to leave
any written record from their meetings. Newspapers, along with books and speeches written by
prominent party members, are the best means by which both voters and historians can learn
about the Know-Nothings.
Studying the Louisiana Know-Nothing Party is important for several reasons. First, it
serves as a case study to show the political vacuum that existed in America after the Whig party
started to decline. This is the same political vacuum that eventually delivered the presidency to
the Republican Party and brought the country to civil war. The research also brings to light the
6

interesting political agency of both immigrants and religious and cultural minorities in the face of
popular nativism. Both immigrants and the Catholic Creoles in Louisiana influenced the KnowNothings in some ways. Most importantly, studying the American Party in Louisiana contributes
to the understanding of how politics in the state—and by extension, the nation—evolved in the
antebellum period.
When studying antebellum Louisiana politics, it is important to understand that since
Louisiana gained statehood, cultural identities affected the state‘s elections. The earliest elections
in the state always pitted recently settled Anglo-American Protestants against French speaking,
Catholic Creoles. When the United States first annexed Louisiana, the population was almost
entirely Creole. Shortly thereafter, a number of Americans resettled in Louisiana and quickly
changed Louisiana‘s demographics. To maintain political power against the rising tide of English
speaking Americans, Creoles operated as a voting bloc. Louisiana developed its own party
system independent of the Era of Good Feelings that existed elsewhere in the country; in
Louisiana, unnamed but identifiable parties split on religious and cultural lines. The Anglophonic
American proto-party was strongest in the northern part of the state, and the Creoles‘ party
gained its strongest support in the New Orleans and the Sugar Parishes.7
Ethnic partisanship continued during the Second Party System when American politics
divided into pro-Andrew Jackson and anti-Jackson factions. Many Creoles politicians ran as
National Republicans and later as Whigs because they held a vendetta against Andrew Jackson
that existed since the Battle of New Orleans in 1814. While some Creoles became Democrats,
the Whigs claimed a majority of Creoles in the late 1830‘s and early 40‘s. Still, in instances
where a Creole Democrat ran against an American Whig, the Creoles crossed party line to vote
7

Sacher, A Perfect War of Politics, 12-16
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for the candidate of their ethnicity. In the decades preceding the 1850‘s, political parties became
more important in Louisiana, but not as important as the ethnic divisions.8
In the late 1840‘s and early 1850‘s the politics of Louisiana changed as New Orleans‘
population grew, making it the largest city in the South. Because the city sits at the mouth of the
Mississippi River, it served as a port of entry for European immigrants who sought to settle in
the country‘s interior. By the beginning of the Civil War, over half a million immigrants entered
the country through New Orleans. The newcomers brought cultures that were unlike that of both
the Creoles and the Americans who already inhabited Louisiana. Newly arrived immigrants,
mostly Irish and German Catholics, piled in the city by the thousands. Most stayed in New
Orleans for only a short while before continuing on to the nation‘s interior, but tens of thousands,
mainly Irish, stayed in New Orleans. Of those who moved on past their port of entry, thousands
settled elsewhere in Louisiana.9
These immigrants not only brought their unique culture, but they introduced new social
problems as well. Many of the recent arrivals, particularly the Irish, emigrated as political and
famine refugees. They arrived in New Orleans with no money to travel far beyond their point of
entry. Thousands of the immigrants were paupers with no means of improving their lot. After
arriving, they lived in dense immigrant ghettos where they sought work from and socialized with
their countrymen. These refugees often viewed America and Louisiana as their temporary home.
They longed for returning to Europe when the troubles ceased. Some of these immigrants
resisted assimilation while they lived in Louisiana.
8
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As Louisiana‘s Irish immigrant population grew through the 1840‘s, the state‘s resources
to aid immigrants diminished. Charity for the refugees from Louisiana‘s established Irish
families waned as the population of unskilled laborers from Ireland increased. Irish settlements
became slums as immigration outgrew available jobs. While most of the immigrants labored on
farms in their home country, they could not continue this livelihood when they arrived in
Louisiana. Irish farmers were inexperienced with Louisiana‘s crops, and the laborers had to
compete with slaves for work. Many of the Irish immigrants faced destitution in Louisiana that
rivaled their condition in Ireland.
Immigrants to Louisiana faced poverty, but whiskey was cheap. As in other large cities,
violence and drunkenness plagued the Irish slums of New Orleans. In most instances, immigrants
directed their violence at their own countrymen. Newspapers reported that the ―wild Irish‖ drank
and engaged in fistfights simply for the love of fighting. Contemporaries also commented on the
correlation between heavy drinking and domestic violence in the immigrant slums. Less
commonly, violence and vice spread beyond the slum and affected others. Immigrant street
children, orphaned by famine or the difficult transatlantic migration, formed thieving gangs who
harassed Louisianans. Irish quarters became the most dangerous and crime-ridden sections of
cities.10
Both the Whigs and the Democrats in Louisiana recognized the potential influence that
immigrants could have on elections. By the middle of the nineteenth century, foreign born
constituted more than a quarter of the state‘s population. These numbers were even higher in the
cities. Between 1830 and 1850, the white population in New Orleans grew from 21,000 to over
91,000, mostly from immigration. Despite this growth, voting turnout in the state remained low.
10

Niehaus, The Irish in New Orleans, 59-62.
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In the 1830 gubernatorial election, only 10,000 people cast a ballot. Presidential election turnouts
were even lower. Both parties recognized that if they could naturalize and register even a fraction
of the immigrants, the new support could change elections in their favor.
Naturalization became a key political issue throughout the state in the 1840‘s. As
opportunists from both parties rushed to naturalize immigrants and encouraged them to vote,
nativist sentiment arose in reaction. Nativist clubs existed well before 1840, but those clubs
remained apolitical. During the 1840 New Orleans Mayoral election, a new political party itself
the ―Native American Repeal Party‖ sought to extend the residency period before immigrants
could be naturalized. The party‘s candidate, cotton press owner William Freret, defeated both his
Whig and Democrat opponents. During the next year, the party convened in New Orleans to
organize and adopt a platform, and the year after that, the party held a national convention to
spread to other states.11
In 1843, a similar party called American Republicans formed before mayoral elections in
New York and Philadelphia on a platform of delaying naturalization for immigrants, limiting
public office to native born citizens, and minimizing Catholicism‘s influence on public
education. American Republican Party members believed two things about immigrant voters:
they had not yet lived in the country long enough to appreciate American democracy, and their
allegiance was with the Pope, not the nation. Immigrants, party members feared, would use their
vote as a commodity and vote for whichever corrupt politicians offered the most money. The
party attracted both Whigs and Democrats, though the Democratic newspapers accused the

11

Carrier, ―The Know-Nothing Movement in Louisiana,” 28-30.
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American Republicans of being Whigs in disguise. After early success, the American
Republicans spread to other cities where immigrants had settled in large numbers.12
The American Republican Party reached Louisiana where it merged with the Native
American Repeal Party to form the Native American Party. The party nominated Charles
Derbigny, son of former governor Pierre Derbigny, for governor in 1846. Unfortunately for
Derbigny, the Native American Party never gained wide acceptance in Louisiana, and in the
election, the Native Americans won just 2.5 percent of the votes. The party dissolved shortly
after Derbigny‘s defeat, but the Native Americans started the conversation about nativism in
Louisiana that would continue for the next two decades.13
While members of both parties became interested in nativism, neither the Whigs nor
Democrats in Louisiana were willing to take a hard stance on the issue of naturalization. Instead,
they took balanced approaches, flirting with nativism where American-born voters had a
majority while rejecting it in immigrant neighborhoods. Both parties nominated nativist
candidates for the 1844 New Orleans Mayor‘s race while sustaining efforts to naturalize and
register more immigrants, sometimes illegally. These efforts were effective; Democrats used
naturalized votes to delivered Louisiana‘s six electoral votes to James K. Polk in the 1844
presidential election in what historians call the ―Plaquemines Frauds.‖ Whigs cried foul at the
event, but that did not stop them from continuing their own program of naturalizing immigrants

12
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to vote for the Whig party. For much of the following decade, naturalization remained an issue of
contention between the parties.14
Several events precipitated the fall of the Whigs in the early 1850‘s. Zachary Taylor‘s
death in 1850 exposed a growing rift between the Northern Whigs and Southern Whigs. While
the war hero was alive, Taylor‘s celebrity attracted both pro-slavery and antislavery Whigs from
both the North and South, but his death exposed the party‘s growing sectional divide. His
successor, Millard Fillmore, was unpopular during his short tenure, and Whigs nominated
Mexican American War general Winfield Scott to run instead of the incumbent in the 1852
election. Scott supported the Compromise of 1850, which brought detractors from both the North
and South. The party may have survived its sectional crisis, but two of the Whigs‘ most
influential leaders, Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, died shortly before the presidential election.
The demoralized and fractured party showed poorly in the 1852 election. Democrat Franklin
Pierce took all but four states to easily beat Scott and win the presidency. The national Whig
Party never recovered from the defeat.15
Historians argue that the Whigs fared poorly in the 1852 national elections because they
failed to distinguish their party from the Democrats. The Whig‘s national convention in 1852
adopted a platform that was similar to the Democrats. Both parties assured constitutionally
limited powers for the federal government, state control over the institution of slavery, and
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enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act. Both parties also supported the Compromise of 1850 as a
solution to the slavery question. The election lacked contentious issues to invigorate voters. As a
result, the apathetic electorate had the worst turnout in decades. With Clay and Webster dead,
and with Scott showing less charisma than Zachary Taylor four years prior, the Whigs did not
have a unique message or a hero that they could get behind.16
American politics experienced a period of transformation in the early 1850‘s. The old
issues of internal improvement and a national bank that defined the era of Jacksonian politics lost
relevance, and both parties insisted that the Compromise of 1850 answered the slavery question.
When the Whigs departed from national politics, opportunistic politicians built new parties to fill
the political void. These parties tackled new issues such as moral and political reform, opposition
to the 1850 compromise, and immigration reform. The Second Party System gave way to a new
era of antebellum politics.17
By 1853, the country was ripe for a new outbreak of nativism. In cities across the
Northeast, Catholic immigrants began challenging Protestant dominance in the public sphere.
The struggle was often fought over public education; Catholics challenged Protestant religious
teaching in public schools. Nativists responded by organizing clubs to resist Catholics. In New
York City, two nativist secret societies, the Order of the Star Spangled Banner and the Order of
United Americans, swelled their ranks. The clubs expanded across state lines, and wigwams—
the name given to lodges of the fraternal organizations—emerged throughout the Northeast. By
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the end of 1853, nativist networks spanned the New England and the Mid-Atlantic regions, and
reached the South and Southwest. Newspapers referred to these groups as ―Know-Nothings,‖ as
member supposedly claimed ignorance when asked about the group. It was from this group that
the American Party gained its political base.18
When the first American Party candidates ran for Philadelphia‘s municipal government
early in 1854, the party already had a national support structure. Americans were immediately
successful at the polls because they had the support of thousands of voters from the KnowNothings clubs, they already had a large public profile by nature of the popularity of the KnowNothing societies, and they already had a network of newspapers to proliferate their message.
Secrecy of the Know-Nothings was more legend than tenet, and voters, especially in the
Northeast, were already familiar with the group before they emerged on the political scene.
Because the Americans ran as opposition to the Democrats, many Whig newspapers rushed to
support the new party. The American Party‘s national rise in popularity was meteoric; within
months, the party held elected positions in every region of the country.
Its decline was equally as swift. In three years, the party all but disappeared on the
national stage. The party focused too narrowly on nativism to maintain wide support. Know
Nothings became unfashionable after violence from election riots soured many voters from
nativism. More importantly, the country was quickly fracturing on the question of slavery‘s
future, and the American Party was unable to produce a unified stance on slavery. After a third
place showing in the 1856 presidential election, Know-Nothingism ceased as a serious national
political movement.

18

Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 24-26. The American Party was the political arm of the KnowNothings. The groups were essentially synonymous before 1856, and they were literally synonymous after that year
when the party lifted their tenet of secrecy and became exclusively a political party.
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The American Party showed resilience in places where it offered a more robust ideology.
Know-Nothings remained a political force in New Orleans city politics, for example, until Union
soldiers forced that government from power in 1862. Since its beginning, the Know-Nothing
Party in Louisiana customized its message for the demographically unique state. Catholic,
French-speaking Creoles‘ political power endured in some parts of Louisiana. Demographics of
other parts of the state more closely resembled the rest of the South. Know-Nothings adjusted
their message in the different parts of the state accordingly. The state party toned down nativist
rhetoric, rejected religious intolerance, took a proslavery stance, and tackled political corruption.
The Louisiana American Party produced a state platform that departed from the national
platform.19
This thesis will attempt to illustrate how the Know-Nothing Party started and gained
traction in three distinct regions in Louisiana at the end of the Second Party System: In New
Orleans, the party was a vehicle for opportunistic politicians to win office amidst corruption, in
the Sugar Parishes, it was a means to continue Whig programs after that party‘s demise, and in
North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes, it was a nativist and anti-Catholic, anti-New Orleans
party. The study pays special attention to the beginning of the organization, and how its
supporters introduced themselves to potential voters and addressed local politics. It looks at some
of the local party leaders in three different regions of Louisiana, to see how they fit into the
Know-Nothing archetype. Most importantly, it will look at who voted for American Party
candidates and where those votes fit in to the larger political trends of the antebellum period. It
will also focus on how the party in Louisiana changed over two years as it faced pressure to

19

Leon Cyprian Soule, The Know-Nothing Party in New Orleans: A Reappraisal (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
Historical Association, 1961), 3; Charles Gayarre, Address to the People of Louisiana on the State of Parties (New
Orleans: Sherman, Wharton, & Company, 1855), 33-36.
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unify and integrate with the national party leading up to the 1856 convention and presidential
election.

16

Chapter 1: New Orleans
On Thursday morning, March 16, 1854, the New Orleans Bee summoned its readers to a
―grand and imposing gathering of the sovereigns this evening in Lafayette Square.‖ The Daily
Crescent, one of the other Whig newspapers in the city, ran a similar piece. The meeting, the
newspapers claimed, should attract both Whigs and Democrats to discuss municipal reform
without partisanship. The next morning, the Bee happily reported that the ―glorious assemblage‖
resulted in the nomination of an anti-party reform ticket to run in the upcoming municipal
elections. The list of candidates, published on the paper‘s front page, boasted names of
established politicians and newcomers to city politics. Whigs constituted a majority of the
nominees, but the ticket included some Democrats, including James W. Breedlove for mayor.
The Bee declared that the grass roots movement would finally bring an era of corrupt party
politics to an end in the Crescent City.20
Not everyone was as optimistic. On the same morning that the Whig press announced the
gathering, the city‘s largest Democrat newspaper questioned who was behind the meeting. The
Louisiana Courier suggested that ―a majority of the signers of the call for the ‗independent‘
meeting‖ belonged to the Know-Nothing secret society. The only reform that interested the
movement was removing voting privileges from naturalized citizens. The secret society, argued
the Democrat paper, consisted mostly of Whigs who, since the fall of the national Whig Party,
longed for membership in something. The Courier cited the fact that the Bee–recently a Whig
newspaper—was quick to support the reform movement as evidence that the reformers were
simply Whigs under a new name.21

20
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During its eight-year existence, the American Party was many things in New Orleans.
The party sought to enact election and immigration reform, repudiate anti-slavery legislation, and
facilitate trade and industry in the Crescent City. Just as importantly, the party was also not many
things. The party was not, as Democrats charged, just Whigs of another name, it did not share the
national party‘s stance on Catholicism, and the party‘s constituency was not entirely AngloSaxon nor entirely Protestant. The local chapter was not, as some historians claim, unionists who
sought to escape sectional divide. New Orleans‘ unique demographics lent to the uniqueness of
the local branch of the party. The New Orleans Know-Nothings treaded a fine line between
existing in union with the national party and operating as an independent party with the same
name.
The New Orleans American Party‘s uniqueness makes them worthy of study. They
seemed to defy the national party at every point of their existence. When the Know-Nothings
first created a ticket for a city election in 1854, the group initially hid their affiliation to the
ticket. Afterwards, the party nominated Catholics and Creoles to state and local offices. The
city‘s most noteworthy contribution to the national party‘s conventions occurred when the New
Orleans branch of the party created controversy at the meetings. When the national party
dissolved after 1856, the New Orleans party remained strong for another six year years. The New
Orleans party‘s refusal to assimilate with the national party shows the great degree to which
political parties in the in antebellum period operated as coalitions of independent and localized
groups.
This study also shows the political agency that ethnic minorities and immigrants
possessed in New Orleans during the antebellum period. Historians describe the American Party
21
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as anti-Catholic and anti-foreigner, but in New Orleans, the party catered to Catholic and
naturalized voters. The local chapter of Know-Nothings openly welcomed Catholics in their
ranks, and they engaged in a bit of doublespeak in regards to immigrant enfranchisement. Even
as the local party‘s platform included a plank to extend residency length before naturalizing
immigrants, they tried to win some of the naturalized vote in the meantime. The party even
nominated Irish candidates to run for assembly position to represent Irish neighborhoods.
Elections in New Orleans often were decided by small margins, and immigrant votes had the
potential to change elections.
The Know-Nothings in New Orleans did not appear suddenly during the March 16th
meeting. Well before they nominated tickets for municipal elections, lodges of the secret group
held meetings and initiations in the city. Because the group left no written record of their
meetings, it is difficult to know how popular the lodges were before they engaged in politics. The
fact that newspapers had written about the Know-Nothings before the Reformers announced their
ticket, though, indicates that the group already existed before March, 1854. Three events created
a political condition in New Orleans that precipitated the transformation of the Know-Nothings
from a secret club to a political party. First, as in New York and Philadelphia, the Know-Nothing
Party in New Orleans grew from the demise of the Second Party System during the first years of
the 1850‘s. Second, a tide of immigration into the city tipped a balance of ethnic political power
between Americans and Creoles that had existed for decades. Third, after sixteen years of
separation, the three distinct municipalities that constituted New Orleans unified under a single
government.
By 1852, the two-party system of Democrats and Whigs started falling apart in New
Orleans. The parties failed to differentiate themselves from each other in any meaningful way.
19

Without real issues separating the parties, they resorted to ad hominem attacks in their campaigns
against each other. In a January 4, 1852, article, the Louisiana Courier accused the Whigs of
being anti-slavery, and the newspaper claimed that the party had no means of maintaining
national support. Whigs newspapers responded with the same accusation against the Democrats.
These attacks masked the fact that neither party defined a unique plan for city government.
Charles Gayarre declared that the Whig Party, ―although retaining its name, sought to become a
counterfeit of its rival.‖ With no meaningful differences, party support depended on party
loyalty: Whigs voted for Whigs and Democrats voted for Democrats because that is what they
had done for years. For both political parties to remain viable, they needed voters to keep their
supporters from losing interest.22
Immigration to the city affected the political balance. By 1850, nearly three out of every
ten white males in Louisiana had been born abroad. Most of the foreign born came by way of
New Orleans, where over 150,000 people entered in the 1840‘s alone. A majority of the
immigrants eventually settled outside of the state, but enough stayed in the Crescent City to
change the politics of the city. The U.S. Naturalization Act of 1795 and the Louisiana
Constitution of 1845 granted naturalization and the right to vote to white male immigrants after
five years in the U.S. and two years in the state. Naturalized voters initially lacked inherent party
loyalty, so both parties fought to attract naturalized votes. Whigs and Democrats accused each
other of supporting nativism in the hopes of securing immigrant votes, and both parties engaged
in purchasing immigrant votes. Politicians dabbled in illegal ―colonizing,‖ or transporting
purchased voters to another precinct to tip the balance in their favor. This was the method by
which John Slidell won Plaquemines Parish for James K. Polk in the 1844 presidential election.
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Political reformers feared—with good reason—that the expansion of suffrage to more
immigrants tempted the politicians with corruption.23
While politicians fought over immigrant votes, the city consolidated under a single
government. In 1836, New Orleans divided into three separate municipalities to ease ethnic
tensions. Creoles dominated the ―first municipality‖ (as designated by the federal census),
Americans were a majority in the second, and the third contained an amalgamation of
immigrants, Creoles, and Americans. For sixteen years, voters in the three municipalities elected
their own mayors and assemblies, and the three municipalities functioned as independent cities.
After financial woes plagued the first and third municipalities, New Orleans elected to organize
under a single city government. A short time later, a new state constitution redrew New Orleans
boundaries to include the suburb of Lafayette. The old municipality boundaries remained, but
instead of separating cities, the boundaries separated four city districts. The second municipality
became the first district, the first municipality became the second district, the third municipality
became the third district, and the town of Lafayette became the fourth district. Four governments
consolidated into one, a surplus of politicians fought over fewer positions, and because the
different ethnic quarters of the city unified under a single government after 1852, politics in New
Orleans became more ethnically plural. 24
Following the disappointing 1852 presidential election and the deaths of Henry Clay and
Daniel Webster, the Whig Party in Louisiana experienced its own collapse in state and local
politics. When the new state constitution took effect in 1853, it called for special elections to fill
23
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new government positions. Whigs lost badly and the party‘s members became disheartened. In
August of that year, only seven parishes sent delegates to the state Whig convention. In
November, Democrats crushed the Whigs in state congressional elections, giving Louisiana‘s
Democrats an insurmountable majority in the legislature. When the new legislature met in Baton
Rouge, its Democratic majority gerrymandered the state‘s voting districts to assure that Whigs
could never regain power in state politics.25
After 1852, the Whigs ran out of issues with which to challenge the Democrats. Between
1850 and 1852, the Louisiana Whigs‘ main campaign issue was to push for a convention to adopt
a new state constitution. They eventually got their way, and the state drafted a new constitution
in 1852. No more contentious issues separated the two parties. A shift in traditional Democratic
causes brought the parties to agreement on what were traditionally Whig causes, such as internal
improvement, public banks, and state funding for railroads. The two parties seemed evenly
matched, but ultimately the Democrats were successful and the Whigs faltered in the state on the
perception that Democrats had a stronger pro-slavery résumé. As a result, the Whigs fell in to
disfavor, leaving a gap in elections for politicians who opposed the Democrats.26
When the Know-Nothings presented themselves as an independent reform movement,
their ploy was not unprecedented. In elections where Whigs had a legislative majority in New
Orleans‘ government, groups of self-proclaimed ―non-partisan‖ reform movements tried to run
against the Whigs. For example, in the 1852 municipal election, a group of ―reformers‖ (though
it is uncertain what they were trying to reform) organized. They claimed to be non-partisan, but
contemporaries recognized its Democratic leaning. One of the leading Democratic newspapers
25
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bemoaned how the Whigs ridiculed the reform movement as a Democrat trick. Two years later,
when the Know-Nothings presented themselves as a reform movement, the same Democratic
newspaper attacked the movement as a Whig trick. The independent reform groups were not
ideologically linked from one election to another, but rather they were a recurring phenomenon
during this period of political change.27
To understand why the Know-Nothings presented their party as a non-partisan reform
movement rather than revealing publicly that they were Know-Nothings, it is important to look
at what contemporary critics wrote about them. Democratic newspapers‘ accusation that the
reformers were Know-Nothings suggests that most New Orleanians were familiar with the group
and that many Democrats in the city were unfriendly to them. The morning after the March 1854
meeting, the New Orleans Courier proclaimed that the meeting was merely a coming out ball for
the new, nativist party. The meeting‘s call for participation was all a ruse; ―the whole thing is
already cut and dry by the ‗knowing ones.‘‖ In another article, the Courier contended that ―a
majority of the signers of the call for the ‗independent meeting‘‖ belonged to ―a new secret
society, a branch of which, we are sorry to hear, has lately been established in our city.‖ KnowNothings were silent about their involvement in the reform meetings because they did not want
their reputation undermining their political ambitions in New Orleans.28
Two weeks after the meeting, Know-Nothings gave up the charade and acknowledged
their part in the gathering. The New Orleans Bee, which became one of the voices of the
movement, confirmed that Know-Nothings indeed existed in the city, and that they were present
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at the Lafayette Square meeting. Despite this, the paper proclaimed that the meeting still
maintained its original goal of non-partisanship. Members of the Know-Nothing society were a
prominent part of the gathering, but they were not the only ones. According to the paper, KnowNothings, Democrats, Whigs, Creoles, Americans, Protestants, and Catholics were all
represented. The Bee admitted that the Know-Nothings had called the meeting, but they were not
the anti-Catholic, nativist group that the Democrat newspapers portrayed. Members of the order
organized the reform movement, but not to recruit for the Know-Nothing cause.29
Indeed more than just Know-Nothings attended the meeting. Even the Democratic
newspapers conceded that people of all political persuasions were present at Lafayette Square
out of curiosity and interest in the movement. When papers first announced the meeting, they did
not indicate the political leaning of the group. Even after the meeting adjourned, nobody hinted
that it was related to underground nativist groups. People from opposing parties attended to
―enjoy the fun‖ of the circus-like atmosphere. Even the next day, the attendees did not realize
that Know-Nothings directed the meeting. One letter to the Courier speculated that they met
under the auspices of John Livingston, who upon failing to garner a Democratic nomination,
sought to challenge his old party. Several days passed before the critics of the Reform movement
recognized their ties to Know-Nothingism.30
The fact that the secret society nominated its own political party ticket was hardly
scandalous. Know-Nothings were not the sole secret club in New Orleans. Many of the city‘s
most prominent men, regardless of their political affiliation, belonged to at least one club. Wellknown Democrat-turned-Whigs-turned-Know-Nothing politician Charles Gayarre received an
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invitation to join the secret, pro-Cuba ―Republican Association‖ just months before he aligned
with the Know-Nothings. Like the Know-Nothings, this lesser known society intended to
nominate candidates for office. The tradition of private clubs forming their own parties harkened
to the Anti-Masons in the 1820‘s. Historian Daniel Walker Howe explains that the transition
from club to party was easier in the nineteenth century because parties printed their own ballots.
All a party needed to do to run in an election was to find a way to distribute its ballot. The rise of
the Know-Nothings in New Orleans may seem odd in today‘s world, but contemporaries would
not be shocked by this course of events.31
The Lafayette Square meeting announced a diverse ticket of forty-two candidates, Whig
and Democrat alike, from various ethnicities. The ticket, published the following day in the Bee,
included J. W. Breedlove for mayor, O. DeBuys for comptroller, William H. Garland for
treasurer, L. H. Pilie for surveyor, and A. J. Phelps as street commissioner, along with four
district recorders, seven aldermen, and twenty-six assistant aldermen. In contrast to the Courier’s
insistence that Whigs dominated the party, the Bee reported that twenty-five of the nominees
were former Democrats, including Breedlove. Although a majority of the candidates were
Anglo-Americans, the roster of candidates included Creole and Irish names as well. The proDemocrat and anti-Reform Courier could not refute the claim that the Know-Nothings presented
a bipartisan ticket, but they instead suggested that the Democrats must have been added to the
ticket without their knowledge.32
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Reformers were not, as contemporaries insisted, simply a continuation of Whigs. Some
Whigs did continue their political careers as Reformers, but this is hardly surprising considering
that only two parties printed tickets in the 1854 municipal election. The Courier points out that
the Independent Reformers‘ nominees for treasurer, comptroller, and surveyor ran for those same
positions as Whigs in the 1852 election. The similarities between the two parties end there. None
of the Reform ticket‘s district recorder nominees ran in the 1852 election, and only one of the
seven aldermen ran for that position in previous elections. The overwhelming majority of
assistant aldermen never ran for office before the ‘54 election. The three city-wide candidates
that the Courier cites—Garland, DeBuys, and Pilie—each won their seat in the previous election
as Whigs, and they became incumbents without a party. The Whigs in New Orleans dissolved
their party in 1854 without nominating a ticket. The three incumbents joined the Reformers
because it was the only way to keep their jobs.33
Though the Bee conceded that the Know-Nothings formed the Reform ticket, the ticket
was not nativist, anti-Catholic, nor anti-Creole as opponents argued. Several nominees, including
surveyor Piliè and comptroller DeBuys were Catholic Creoles. Historian Lyon Soulè argues that
inclusiveness of Creoles would have been almost mandatory if a party was to succeed in
antebellum New Orleans. ―No ticket could be formed without bearing the names of Creoles, by
birth and by baptism Catholic,‖ he argued. The Reform ticket went further in the case of Piliè
and DeBuys by nominating the Creole politicians to city-wide offices. Of the forty-nine positions
filled by the election, only five—the offices of the mayor, comptroller, treasurer, surveyor, and
street commissioner—were decided by every voter in the city. In contrast, district recorders were
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picked only by their district, and individual wards chose their aldermen and assistant aldermen.
With Piliè and DeBuys, 40 percent of the Reformer nominees for city-wide offices were Catholic
Creoles.34
The election, held two weeks after the meeting, brought mixed success to the
Independent Reformers. Despite the landslide defeat for their mayoral candidate, James
Breedlove, to Democratic candidate, John Lewis, Reformer candidates won the treasurer‘s,
comptroller‘s, surveyor‘s and street commissioner‘s races. They also elected four aldermen and
eighteen assistant aldermen against the Democrats nine aldermen and nine assistants. The
Reformer party won the district recorder race in the first district, but they lost the other three
districts. Just two weeks after the party‘s inception the reformers won twenty-seven of the fortytwo races it had entered. 35
The election returns suggest that the 1854 race featured a decline in party loyalty. Voters
tended to elect the individual candidates rather than vote on strict party or ethnic lines. Wards
that elected Democratic candidates in one race did not necessarily vote for the Democrat in other
races. Similarly, those who voted for the Reform candidate did not necessarily vote that way in
all elections. Voting did not follow any ethnic pattern, either. Districts that voted for Creole
candidates in one race did not necessarily vote for Creoles in other races. The election marks a
period of political realignment in New Orleans. Some districts that voted Democrat in the 1852
municipal election voted for Reform candidates in 1854, and some Whig districts elected
Democrats.
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In the mayoral race, Democrat John L. Lewis defeated Reformer J. W. Breedlove in a
landslide, despite losing the mayor‘s race in 1852. Lewis garnered nearly 61 percent of the
12,333 votes cast, winning all four districts. Even in the American majority first and fourth
districts, Lewis topped Breedlove by 91 and 251 votes, respectively. This was a marked
improvement for Lewis, who had run for the same position two years earlier but lost to Whig
Abdiel Crossman. In that year, Lewis had lost in the American districts as well as the Creole
dominated second district (though he lost the second district by only eleven votes). In the 1854
election, Lewis gained 51 percent of the first district‘s votes, an overwhelming 67 percent of the
second district‘s votes, and 58 percent of the fourth district‘s votes. Both candidates in the 1854
race shared American, Protestant pedigrees, so the results could not be explained ethnically. The
Reform candidate‘s bad defeat to a candidate who lost two years before suggests the city‘s
disdain for Breedlove.
The same was not true of the comptroller‘s race, where Creole Whig-turned-Reformer
DeBuys fared much better than Breedlove. In his race against American Democrat Kerr, DeBuys
won the first district handily, taking 67 percent of the votes. Despite sharing an ethnic heritage
with the majority in the second district, DeBuys lost by 4 percent in that section. The immigrantheavy third district split between the two candidates, and the fourth district gave a slight nod to
DeBuys. This gave the Reform candidate a 7 percent advantage over his opponent across the
city. The two districts he won in the 1854 election are the two that he lost in the 1852 election. In
the second district, where DeBuys won his 1852 race by over 200 votes, he lost by the same
margin in 1854. In the third district, Debuys won by 210 votes in 1852, but he lost by seven in
1854.
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In the treasurer‘s race, the Independent Reformer candidate won every district. The
election pitted two American candidates against one another, and Independent Reformer
candidate Garland won with 55 percent of the vote. The third district, where Garland received
less than 44 percent of the votes in 1852, gave the incumbent a 102 vote majority in 1854. The
Creole district voted for Garland at about the same rate in both elections. In the fourth election,
where he had not gained a majority but still won against two opponents in 1852, Garland beat his
Democratic opponent, Collins, by a huge 22 percent margin.
The Reformers‘ surveyor candidate, Creole Piliè, won his race by the same margins
Garland despite not sharing his ethnicity. Piliè received just forty-five fewer votes that his fellow
Reformer, Garland. The greatest differences between the two races were in the first and second
districts. In the American first district, the American Garland received fewer than 300 more votes
than his fellow party member Piliè. In the Creole second district, Creole Piliè received fewer
than 300 more votes than Garland. Piliè and Garland polled virtually identically in the third and
fourth districts. The data suggests that if ethnic and religious bias infiltrated New Orleans‘s
municipal politics with the rise of the Know-Nothings, it did so to the amount of 600 votes, an
amount too insignificant to swing any elections.
Neither party won all races in a single district. The first district elected the Democratic
mayoral candidate, John Lewis, but voted for the Reform candidate for comptroller, treasurer,
surveyor, and street commissioner. The second district voted for Democrats in the mayoral,
comptroller, and street commissioner‘s races, and voted for Reformers for the treasurer and
surveyor‘s races. In the third district, Democrats won the mayor‘s and street commissioner‘s
race, Reformers won the treasurer‘s and surveyor‘s race, and the comptrollers race was virtually
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tied (Democrats won by seven votes). The fourth district voted Democrat for the mayor and
treasurer, and Reformer for the other three positions.
Just as ethnicity seemed unimportant in the election, voters seemed not to vote on
financial lines either. In some cases, wards that had similar amounts of wealth voted for
different parties. The second and eighth wards, for example, stood on opposite sides of the city,
but in the 1850‘s they had similar demographic statistics. They had about the same numbers of
white males in the 1850 census, with the second ward‘s population 2,000 fewer than the eighth‘s.
The economic standings of the two wards appeared similar as well. The city assessment from
1856 listed the taxable wealth per person of the second and eighth (subtracting business capital
and corporate wealth), was nearly indistinguishable. Still, the two parties voted for opposing
parties in the 1854 election: the second ward elected Reformer candidates to all district positions,
while the eighth ward elected Democrats to their district‘s offices.36
The different outcomes between the individual races suggest that this election was one
that emphasized the individual over the party and ethnicity. Voters in the election tended not to
vote straight party tickets, and neither party could win an entire district. Only two of the city
wide candidates won in every district, and these two—Democratic mayor candidate Lewis and
Reformer surveyor candidate Piliè—shared neither party affiliation nor ethnicity. Conversely,
only one candidate, James Breedlove, lost in every district. No district elected all of the Creole
candidates, nor did any district vote for exclusively American candidates.
New Orleans was not immune to election rioting, but violence during the 1854 election
did not impact the result of the election, and there was no evidence that the nativists perpetrated
the violence. Two men died in Election Day attacks in the city, but both of these occurred in the
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American quarter, not the immigrant neighborhoods. The Bee reported no excitement or violence
in the second or third district below Canal Street, but it described some excitement in the first
district. No papers mentioned the nationality or politics of the dead or the assailants. Attackers
killed one of the men at the seventh precinct polls, where a day earlier, the Bee warned that
voting fraud may occur. That article encouraged readers to ―keep the polls free, challenge
suspicious votes, and aid in preserving the sanctity of the ballot box‖ by stationing ―strong force
at each precinct.‖ The man suffered his violent demise to a mob after they accused him of voting
twice. He was as likely a victim of media-promoted vigilantism as he was a victim of nativism.37
While the Reformers did not use the Know-Nothing or American Party monikers for the
1854 election, they were absolutely members of that party. The New Orleans party continued to
call themselves ―Independent Reformers‖ despite participating in the state and national KnowNothing conventions and supporting American candidates in elections outside of New Orleans.
Historians claim that because of the ethnic makeup of the city, the party did not use the word
―American‖ to describe their municipal tickets in fear of alienating the Creole and immigrant
voters. The Reformers‘ political opponents did not make such a distinction; in the days preceding
the election, Democratic newspapers use the terms ―Know-Nothings‖ and ―Independent
Reformers‖ interchangeably. While little is known about the inner working of the New Orleans
Know-Nothing meetings in 1854 (they were still a secret group and left no written record)
historians and contemporaries agree that the group was behind the Independent Reform Party.38
Following its moderate success in the 1854 municipal election, the New Orleans KnowNothings won a series of political victories that made them the dominant party in the city. In a
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sparsely participated election in September, 1854, the New Orleans group successfully fielded an
American Party candidate for state senate. After showing that it could get representation in the
state legislature, the party turned its focus back to dominating the city council. The KnowNothings once again nominated an Independent Reform ticket for the 1855 municipal elections
and proved it could win in every district of the city. By the end of the election, the KnowNothings boasted more elected politicians in New Orleans than the Democrats.39
Just as in the 1854 election, in 1855 the Know-Nothings nominated a diverse Reform
ticket without regard to the candidates‘ ethnicity or religion. Their goal, they claimed, was to
continue to reform the corrupt government that left the city ―under the dreadful burden of
taxation; its finances are terribly dilapidated, and its credit ought to be above suspicion.‖ KnowNothing newspapers called upon the city‘s ―brightest citizens‖ and ―friends of good government‖
to repair the municipalities damaged finances and rebuild its infrastructure. Their ticket
nominated several Catholics and Creoles, which included almost every candidate from the
Second District. Just as in the 1854 election, most of the Creole Reformers won their races. In
fact, most of the Reform candidates of all ethnicities won their races; Reformers won thirty-four
of the thirty-five races they entered.40
After a year of success around the country, Know-Nothings sought to consolidate their
political gains with a national convention, but instead they exposed the sectional rift in the party.
In June, 1855, Know-Nothing delegates from across the country met in Philadelphia to draft the
American Party platform and consolidate the party for the 1856 presidential election. The
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meeting reached a crisis when Southern Know-Nothings announced their plank to preserve
existing slavery laws, prohibit Congress from denying slavery in territories, and prohibit
Congress from limiting slavery in the District of Columbia. Northern Know-Nothings challenged
the plank and called for the Missouri Compromise‘s return. After much debate, the convention
voted to include the Southern plank. Several Northern delegates repudiated the platform, and
some even left the party. The convention ended with a new American Party national platform
and a divided party.41
The convention exposed a division within the Louisiana state Know-Nothing Party as
well. The state sent two separate delegations to Philadelphia: a mixed Protestant and Catholic
group—dominated by the New Orleans party—and an all Protestant ―Simon Pure‖ delegation.
Newspapers reported that the Protestant and Catholic New Orleans delegation was not aware of
the ―Simon Pure‖ group until both arrived at the convention. Though they both represented the
same state, the convention decided to admit both groups. When the Philadelphia convention
began on June 8, the two Louisiana delegations challenged each other over Catholic inclusion in
the party. While the New Orleans–led delegation maintained their stance of religious tolerance,
the ―Simon Pures‖ fought to require religious tests to keep Catholics out of the party. The
Protestant delegation proved to be more in line with the mainstream Know-Nothings, and the
national party adopted a strict anti-Catholic platform. Disgusted, most of the pro-religioustolerance faction left the convention in protest.42
After the national convention rebuked the New Orleans Know-Nothing‘s religious
tolerance, the local party became more, not less, dedicated to inclusiveness. Know-Nothing
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newspapers reported with self-awareness that the local arm of the party had gone against
American Party mores. The New Orleans group would not begrudgingly accept the platform, but
instead they would continue to reject anti-Catholicism. According to the Bee, ―the conduct of the
majority of the Philadelphia Convention renders it an imperative duty of the party here to mark
out a distinct, independent, and manly course; to disavow every feature in the National
programme [sic] which has the slightest tendency to sectarian intolerance.‖ Because the
American Party continued to be the only nationally viable opposition to the Democrats, the New
Orleans party did not completely divorce from the national party, but they sought to rebuke the
anti-Catholicism with their own state platform.43
Louisiana Know-Nothings converged on Baton Rouge in July, 1855, to nominate
candidates for the upcoming state election and to adopt their state party platform. The meeting
generated much excitement, and every parish sent a delegation. Upon convening, the delegates
continued the battle over Catholic inclusion in the party. This time, the pro-Catholic faction
defeated the Simon Pures. The party nominated two Catholic Creoles to statewide offices for the
fall election: Charles Derbigny of Jefferson Parish for governor and J.V. Duralde of West Baton
Rouge for treasurer. The convention also named five Protestant Americans from Orleans, East
Baton Rouge, Ouachita, Rapides, and Claiborne parishes to the other contentious statewide
positions. The Louisiana Know-Nothings constructed a diverse ticket for the state election just as
they had done in the New Orleans municipal elections.44
The Louisiana American Party convention created its own platform to repudiate the
national one on religious intolerance and to reinforce the national platform‘s protection of

43

New Orleans Bee, June 23, 1855.

44

New Orleans Bee, July 4, 1855; New Orleans Bee, July 6, 1855

34

slavery. The ninth plank in the platform adopted by the convention expressly attacked religious
tests for office. The framers declared that the American Party in Louisiana were ―friends of
religious as well as civil liberties, and that [they] are opposed to any political proscription for
religious faith, either as to the right of voting or holding office.‖ The convention then reacted to
the anti-slavery stance of the Northern Know-Nothings, passing several resolutions to protect
slavery. The convention did not address immigration or immigrant suffrage until the fifth and
sixth resolutions. The state party‘s platform was unique; it resembled neither the Democrats‘ nor
the Know-Nothing Party in other states‘.45
Know-Nothing campaigners held a ratification rally in New Orleans where they
highlighted the state platform‘s departure from the national party. State party president William
Perkins, flanked by a number of party vice presidents of American, Creole, and Irish lineage
paraded to cheers through Lafayette Square in front of ―tens of thousands‖ of onlookers. Several
prominent party members, including Catholics Derbigny and Dreux (Charles Gayarre, probably
the most famous Catholic party member could not attend due to illness) addressed the crowd.
The Creole speakers, Catholic nominees, and planks on religious tolerance proved to the
attendees that the American Party continued to support ethnic and religious tolerance as it had
since its first Reform meeting sixteen months earlier.46
The convention‘s state policy sought to continue the party‘s earlier mission to end
corruption in local politics and to provide internal improvements for the state. Officially, the
party opposed political patronage. The New Orleans Daily Picayune, which by 1855 had become
a Know-Nothing organ, reported that the Louisiana Know-Nothings ―believe that the office
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should seek the man, and not the man the office, and [they] should oppose the distribution of
office among office seekers, or as a reward for partisan service.‖ As part of its‘ state mission, the
party sought to ―reform the abuses‖ in the Louisiana‘s expenditures. The party‘s platform
declared that money should not go to partisan causes, but rather it should go to ―education of the
youth of the country in school established by the state,‖ the establishment of ―a constitutional
organization of the swampland commission,‖ and ―a more efficient administration of the Internal
Improvement Department with a view of improving our inland navigation.‖47
The Louisiana American Party emerged from their convention as foremost a pro-slavery
party. The state Know-Nothing platform, touted by the New Orleans branch of the party, argued
that an attack on slavery was an attack on the constitution. The New Orleans Know-Nothings
issued a series of resolutions at their ratification rally, declaring that the states‘ rights of selfdetermination are constitutionally guaranteed, and any attempt to alter that constitution must be
completed without ―sectional and unloyal prejudices.‖ They resolved to ―uphold and enforce our
constitutional right on the subject of slavery.‖ The state party vowed to urge Northern KnowNothings to ―annul and rebuke the vain and unconstitutional efforts of Nullifiers and
Abolitionists to oppose and overthrow the federal laws and disturb the harmony of the Union.‖
The convention went on to pass a resolution condemning president Franklin Pierce for
―appointing and retaining Free Soilers in office.‖ For the New Orleans Know-Nothings, any
attempts to pass laws to limit slavery threatened the union, and being friendly with anti-slavery
parties was an act of hostility.48
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In addition to making their pro-slavery stance a priority, the New Orleans KnowNothings emphasized another issue that they had not during the 1854 elections: they focused
more on residency extensions for naturalizing immigrants. For the party, these two issues were
linked; the Know-Nothings demanded twenty-one years of residence before an immigrant can
become naturalized as a means of protecting slavery and Southern power. Almost all immigrants
to American in the 1850‘s came from countries that had outlawed slavery. Party members argued
that thousands of immigrants continued to enter America through New Orleans, but increasingly,
they settled permanently in other sections of the country. The South grew from immigration, but
not as rapidly as the North. By extending residency restrictions for immigrants to vote, they kept
suffrage from likely anti-slavery voters and reduced the Northern vote. Northern Know-Nothings
already pushed for the residency requirements for more purely nativist reasons, so by adopting
the plank on residency extension, the New Orleans Know-Nothings brought their party into
harmony with the national party while still building their pro-slavery reputation.
Know-Nothings across the South perceived the pro-slavery, pro-Southern benefit of
nativism. The New Orleans Bee reprinted a speech by Virginia governor William ―Extra Billy‖
Smith in which the popular Old Dominion politician declared that nativism originally existed in
the South to correct the unfair congressional representation that the North enjoyed. Extra Billy
argued, ―The North has 55 more Representatives than the South already. The natural increase of
the South is one third greater than of the North because there are greater checks on population
there, but the artificial element of foreignism brings 500,000 who settle annually in free states,
with instincts against slavery, making 50 representatives in the past 10 years to swell opposition
in the South.‖ Smith called on the Know-Nothings to end immigration, or at least end
immigrants‘ abilities to vote or be counted for representation, to allow natural population growth
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in the South to catch up with the North‘s larger population. In time, the population of the South
would meet or exceed that of the North, and the growing movement to end slavery could be met
with a powerful pro-slavery force.49
Despite the state party platform‘s departure from the national party‘s, the New Orleans
Know-Nothings did not wish to withdraw from the national party. Instead, they insisted that the
whole American Party would eventually come around to the Louisiana form of KnowNothingism. Charles Gayarre, who by 1855 had become a dominant figure in the party in New
Orleans, proclaimed, ―I am led to hope that the national platform of the American Party will soon
be cleansed from the only stain which disgraces its purity,‖—the party‘s religious intolerance.
When California Know-Nothings adopted a Louisiana-like state platform that rebuked religious
tests, the New Orleans Know-Nothings heralded the news as proof that the rest of the country
would soon adopt their brand of Know-Nothingism. ―We rejoice,‖ the Bee reported, from the
bottom of our hearts at triumph achieved by our gallant brethren of California; and our exultation
is greatly enhanced by the reflection that the platform of the American Party of California is
substantially the LOUISIANA platform [sic].‖ If the Know-Nothing Party in a free state could
recognize the New Orleans party‘s vision of the party, then surely the rest of the country would
come around to their way of thinking.50
In reality, the national party was continuing to find difficulty in defining their stance on
national issues beyond extending residency requirements for immigrants. Northern and Southern
wings of the party seemed unable to find common ground on any other issue. The party across
the country began to fracture, and in the second half of 1855, the American Party lost steam. Its
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decline was so rapid that it rivaled the party‘s rise. The question of slavery divided the party on
sectional lines, and after Northern Know-Nothings failed to pass anti-slavery resolutions during
the Philadelphia convention, the anti-slavery component of the party left en masse for the
Republican Party. The Northern Know-Nothings who remained in the party divided on their
response to the South‘s pro-slavery demands for the party. The party continued to drift in
different directions through 1855, a process that accelerated following Millard Fillmore‘s
nomination during a chaotic national convention in February, 1856.51
While the national party split, the New Orleans Know-Nothing Party remained confident
through the 1855 state elections. The party‘s candidates did not fare well in most of Louisiana,
but in New Orleans, the Know-Nothings continued to be successful, though the election was
wrought with violence and corruption. The New Orleans Daily Picayune reported that
gubernatorial candidate Charles Derbigny, as well as the American candidates for lieutenant
governor, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, attorney general, and superintendent of education
won all but the Fourth district. Initially, it appeared that the party‘s candidate also won the
Orleans Parish sheriff‘s race—a result that was reversed when Democrats challenged the election
with charges of voter suppression. Derbigny and most of his American Party running mates
ultimately lost the election, but not for lack of support in the Crescent City.52
New Orleans Know-Nothings‘ optimism persisted through the winter into the national
American Party Convention in February that resulted in Millard Fillmore‘s presidential
candidacy. The nominating meeting was chaotic; many Northern Know-Nothings walked out of
meetings allowing the remaining Southern delegates to adopt a proslavery platform. The
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nomination of Fillmore, the former president whose legacy included signing the Fugitive Slave
Act, alongside running mate, Andrew Jackson Donelson, alienated the remaining antislavery
Know-Nothings. The party in New Orleans touted the nomination as a great success and a wise
decision. The New Orleans Daily Picayune wrote that the nomination was ―met with a cordial
response here by all.‖ The Bee regarded the nominations as a victory for pro-slavery forces. The
paper argued that despite his upbringing in New York, Fillmore remained conservative on the
issue of slavery. When ―abolition reared its miscreanted [sic] front,‖ the Bee recalled, Fillmore
signed the Fugitive Slave Act. The New Orleans Know-Nothing organs rejoiced at having a
slave owning Southerner on the ticket as well. Andrew Jackson Donelson, nephew of the seventh
president and namesake, owned slaves at both his Tennessee home and his Mississippi
plantation.53
Know-Nothings in the North and the West were less thrilled about the nominations.
Newspapers in the North decried the Fillmore nomination as the end of the party. To them,
Fillmore seemed a peculiar choice, as he had no background as a nativist. They further pointed to
the admission of the Catholic delegation from Louisiana as evidence that the party did not focus
enough on the tenet of nativism. For Northern Know-Nothings, the nomination of Fillmore and
lenience on Catholicism made the party a pro-slavery counterfeit of the Democrats.54
Even the Democratic press in New Orleans recognized that the Know-Nothings held a
stronger proslavery stance, and they admonished the party for being too regional. The
Fillmore/Donelson ticket, while strongly proslavery, the Democratic Courier claimed, polarized
the electors. In contrast, the Democrats in New Orleans took advantage of the Know-Nothing‘s
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regional divide to promote themselves as a unified national party. They declared, ―What may be
the success of the nomination of Mr. Fillmore may have in catching the votes of the old line
Whigs is beyond conjective [sic]; it is well known, however, that the truly patriotic and
conservative members of that respectable but now disorganized party have long since given their
adhesion to liberal nationality and conservatism as represented by the Democratic Party.‖ A vote
for the American Party, the Courier argued, was a vote for sectionalism and a fractured America.
The Democrats presented themselves as a unionist party in contrast to the Americans as the party
of sectionalism.55
The charges that the Americans were not a national party proved to be true, and after the
convention, Know-Nothings in the North left the party in droves. As early as 1854 in some
Midwestern states, Americans and Republicans formed coalitions and created joint tickets to run
against the Democrats in state and local elections. After the 1856 Know-Nothing convention, the
supporters of the coalition in those states simply abandoned the American Party moniker and
joined the Republicans. By 1856, Republicans had proven that they presented a formidable
challenge to the Democrats in the North, and all but the most conservative Know-Nothings in
that region departed the American Party for the Republicans. Several events during the election
year, including the outbreak of violence in Kansas and Preston Brooks beating Charles Sumner
in the Senate, changed the election to one with sectional parties. With Know-Nothings losing
virtually all support in the North and still unable to overtake the Democrats as the leading party
in the South, the American Party lost its significance in presidential politics. Gaining only eight
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electoral votes in the presidential election (compared to 174 for the Democrats and 114 for the
Republicans), the Know-Nothings died as a nationally viable party.56
While the party ceased to exist in most parts of the country, including the majority of
Louisiana, the Americans continued to dominate the New Orleans municipal government. In
March, 1856, voters elected Charles Waterman as the first of three consecutive American Party
mayors. The omnipotence of the American Party in city government and the inability of the
Democratic candidates to gain ground against them made the Democrats resort to election
gimmicks. Much like the Know-Nothings in 1854, Democrats led supposedly ―Independent
Reform‖ movements in 1858 and 1859. One of the movements even attempted to restore the
Whig Party to the city. Despite that attempt, the American political machine became entrenched
in the city, and despite sometimes-violent opposition by the Democrats, they persevered. Only
occupation by Union soldiers in 1862 could dislodge the American Party from the Crescent
City.57
The Know-Nothing Party in New Orleans began as a political coalition to unclench the
Democratic stranglehold on the city only to become the unshakable incumbent party four years
later. Controlling municipal government had always been the goal for the American Party in the
city. Locally minded reformers organized under the banner of Know-Nothingism solely because
after the fall of the Whig Party, the American Party provided the best opportunity for opposing
the Democrats at a time when Whigs dare not join their old foes. The New Orleans American
Party fared well in local elections, and in just over a year it controlled the general assembly of
the city. By 1856, the New Orleans Know-Nothings controlled virtually every level of city

56

Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 211-219.

57

Soule, The Know Nothing Party in New Orleans, 91-105.

42

government. The New Orleans arm of the party was also powerful component in the state‘s
Know-Nothing organization, and it imposed the local party‘s ideology on the state party‘s
platform.58
The New Orleans Know-nothings never shared the core ideology of the national party.
The city was multicultural and cosmopolitan since its inception, and New Orleans never accepted
the violent sectarianism that was ubiquitous with the Know-Nothing Party elsewhere. Even in the
first municipal election that the Know-Nothings ran, the party could not have achieved its
victories without support from Catholic Creoles and naturalized voters. When the national party
tried to force their New Orleans brethren into a more ideological union with Know-Nothings
elsewhere in the country, the local party pushed back by formally advocating religious tolerance.
Already distanced from the national party on the issue of religious tolerance, the New Orleans
Know-Nothings adopted resolutions unrelated to nativism for their municipal and state
platforms. As the American Party crumbled, New Orleans Know-Nothings diversified their
ideology to become a pro-slavery political machine. The party remained strong in the city, and in
the days before Union soldiers occupied the city, New Orleans remained a lone island of KnowNothingism in a land that had long forgotten the party.
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Chapter 2: The Sugar Parishes
In contrast to the party‘s immediate success in New Orleans, the Know-Nothings
influence crept slowly through the sugar-producing rural parishes of South Louisiana. No
―glorious assemblage‖ of ―tens of thousands‖ met in the cities of Houma, Thibodaux, or
Plaquemine; the white population of most parishes numbered fewer than 5,000. Know-Nothings
joined the political fray in the Sugar Parishes only after the party had organized in New Orleans.
The American Party gradually grew for two years preceding the 1856 presidential election.
When the Whig party did not run in New Orleans municipal election in 1854, apathy for the
Whigs spread to the rural towns and villages upriver from New Orleans, and former Whigs
abandoned their old party for the upstart American Party. By 1855, no Whig party existed in
Southeast Louisiana. Two years later, no American Party existed either.
Geographic isolation and unique economic interests in the Sugar Parishes forged a
society that was economically and politically different than New Orleans. While residents of the
rural parishes looked to New Orleans as their link to the outside world, their interests were often
incongruent. Self-sufficient communities grew along the rivers and bayous of South Louisiana to
serve a plantation economy. Sugar parishioners recognized New Orleans‘ importance as a
marketplace for the planters‘ production, but rural Louisianans were locally minded in their daily
interactions. Sugar Parishes‘ planters, farmers, and craftsmen cared more about the tariff and
internal improvement than election reform. Their politics centered on the preservation of the
planter society rather than partisanship and ethnicity.
The politics of the sugar-producing, agricultural parts of South Louisiana is worthy of
study because the region‘s economy and culture was unlike anywhere else in the country, and the
presence of the Know-Nothings in such a location seems to be an anomaly. In places like
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Ascension, Assumption, Iberville, Lafourche, Plaquemines, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the
Baptist, St. Martin, St. Mary, Terrebonne, West Baton Rouge, and the western half of Jefferson
Parishes, sugar dominated the economy. In 1850, more than 90 percent of the country‘s total
sugar production came from South Louisiana, and the state‘s sugar plantations were some of the
most opulent in the South. American and Creole landowners in the region disregarded their
ethnic differences to form a multi-ethnic class of planter elites. To protect their status and wealth,
the sugar planters found their political interest in opposition to planters further north in Louisiana
who grew cotton. Immigration did not impact political life in these parishes as much (except for
the areas closest to New Orleans in Jefferson and Plaquemines parishes) as it did in Orleans
Parish. Despite this, before the end of 1854, the Know Nothings became a force in the municipal
politics of Plaquemine, Houma, Thibodaux, and Donaldsonville, and some of the most ardent
support for the American candidates in subsequent elections came from the Sugar Parishes.
Few historians have investigated how the American Party gained traction—and in some
towns thrived—in the Sugar Parishes of southern Louisiana. Most historians, when looking at the
Know-Nothing party in the state, treat the sugar growing parishes as an extension of the New
Orleans area. When historians do talk about the party in places like Houma and Donaldsonville,
they give the same reason for the Creole population‘s acceptance of the party as they do when
discussing the New Orleans Know-Nothings. Marius Carriere‘s research shows that the KnowNothings made headway in this largely Catholic region because many Catholic Whigs felt more
comfortable with the nativist party than they did with the Democrats. Carriere states that the
strength of the Know-Nothings in the rural Sugar Parishes depended on planters‘ antipathy for
the Democrats, not unlike some of the Whigs in New Orleans.59
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Carriere‘s research is valuable, but data shows that the political tendencies of the Sugar
Parishes were much more complex. While Catholics in some parishes may have voted for KnowNothings because of their unease with Democracy, this tendency was far from universal.
Comparing election returns from across the Sugar Parishes shows that support for the KnowNothings in the region varied greatly from town to town and from parish to parish. For example,
while West Baton Rouge and Lafourche had large Know-Nothing majorities in 1855 and 1856
elections, Assumption and Iberville, which geographically bookended West Baton Rouge and
Lafourche, voted for Democrats. In some instances, parishes that were adjacent to one another
and had similar demographics voted for different parties. Relying on census data and election
returns alone, and barring more complete sub-parish and sub-town level demographics and
election returns, historians have a hard time finding universal voting patterns in Louisiana‘s
sugar region.60
Throughout the years of the Second Party System, voters in the Sugar Parishes chose
their party based on four criteria. First, parishioners voted for the party that they felt could
preserve the economic advantage enjoyed by sugar planting in the region. Second, they voted to
preserve slavery and the status quo of racial hierarchy in the region. Third, they voted in line
with family alliances that dictated much of how sugar parishioners lived their lives. Finally,
citizens in rural Louisiana followed New Orleans political trends with varying degrees of
interest, and some voted on the same partisan lines as their statesmen in the crescent city.
To understand politics in the Sugar Parishes, it is important to understand that sugar
planting was a lucrative venture. By the middle of the nineteenth century, sugar planting became
60 th
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the most profitable form of agriculture in the South, and as a result, Louisiana‘s farms became
some of the most valuable in the country. In 1850, Louisiana claimed less than one percent of
total farms and just 1.4 percent of all improved farmland in the country, but the state contained
more than 2.3 percent of total farm value. Louisiana‘s farms ranked fifth in the nation and first in
the south in value per acre of improved land. Within the state, the most valuable farmland existed
in the sugar belt. The six parishes with the most value per acre—Ascension, Assumption,
Iberville, Plaquemines, St. Mary, and Terrebonne—all produced sugar as their primary cash
crops. 1850 was not a fluke year. The census a decade later shows that Louisiana‘s farms were
second only to New Jersey‘s in value per acre. Once again, this 1860 census showed that the
sugar producing parishes contained the most valuable acreage in the state. 61
The sugar industry in the U.S., of which Louisiana had a virtual monopoly, had long
relied on the American System to keep sugar prices high and to get its product to market. The
Whig-backed economic plan had plenty of detractors in the south, but many voters in the Sugar
Parishes backed the internal improvements and the tariff. Louisiana‘s sugar planters declared that
protection was not only good for them, but good for the country as a whole. At least one sugar
planter reasoned that without protection, people who produced sugar would instead grow cotton
and over-saturate cotton markets. Although historians do not agree on the viability of Louisiana
sugar without the benefit of protection, there is little debate that the series of tariffs passed after
1828 enjoyed wide popularity in South Louisiana. Internal improvements—especially new
railroads and canals to help planters in far flung rural parishes move their crop to market—were
equally as popular in the region. During the first half of the nineteenth century, South Louisiana
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remained mostly wilderness and wanting in infrastructure, and planters in remote parts of the
state depended on faster transportation and better ports to earn profits.62
Unsurprisingly, the Sugar Parishes turned in to bastions of Whiggery during the years of
the Second Party System. Elections showed a positive correlation between the scale of sugar
production and Whig votes. The ten parishes that produced the most sugar voted for Whig
candidates in nearly three out of four elections. The next ten biggest sugar producers voted for
Whigs in just over half of the elections between 1828 and 1844. Comparatively, in the sixteen
parishes that produced no sugar, Whigs won only a quarter of all elections. Popularity of the
tariff and internal improvements were so great in South Louisiana that even Democrats in the
sugar region did not challenge the American System. One Democratic newspaper justified sugar
protection in spite of the party‘s traditional stance by declaring that a tax on imported sugar was,
in fact, not a tariff, but a revenue duty. Opposition to sugar duty by either party would amount to
political suicide in South Louisiana.63
Equally critical to the continued prosperity of sugar planters, the preservation of slavery
was among the highest priority of both parties in South Louisiana. Although historians do not
agree that the Louisiana sugar industry would have perished without the tariff, they do agree that
antebellum sugar plantations depended on large slave labor forces. The number of slaves
correlated to the profitability of sugar plantations; as the number of slaves on a plantation
increased, the profits increased exponentially. The parishes that grew the most sugar were also
the parishes with the most slaves. In these parishes, the slave population dwarfed the free
population. This fact did little to quell anxiety of free whites who constantly feared slave
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rebellion. For free whites, protecting slavery in remote sugar planting communities was as much
about safety as it was profit.64
While this thesis does not intend to enter the discussion on Southern economic
dependence on slavery, it needs emphasizing that the sugar-producing region of Louisiana was a
noteworthy case. In the 1840, 1850, and 1860 census, Louisiana ranked third behind just
Mississippi and South Carolina for having the highest number of slaves as a percent of the total
population—all this despite Louisiana‘s urban population. Louisiana had the highest ratio of
slaves to acres of farmland by far—at least 25 percent more than the next highest state in both
the 1850 and 1860 census. In 1850, Louisiana‘s farms averaged one slave for every 650 acres of
improved land. Sugar producing parishes had even higher concentrations. Ascension, St.
Bernard, St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, St. Mary, and Terrebonne Parishes all had more than
one slave per 500 acres of improved land. High concentration of slaves improved profit; the six
rural parishes with the highest number of slaves per acre were all in the top ten for land value per
acre as well.65
The high number of slaves in the Sugar Parishes and the wealth produced from planting
sugar brought white men from different ethnic and economic backgrounds together in this region
unlike New Orleans. Americans and Creoles in the region, both wealthy and poor, shared
common political interests for three reasons. First, because slaves in several of the parishes
outnumbered whites, slave owners and non-slave owners alike shared an interest in maintaining
the stability of slavery. Second, planters and small farmers depended on one another in the
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interest of the parishes‘ self-sufficiency. Third, Creoles and Americans in the Sugar Parishes
intermarried and interacted with each other socially.
The high concentration of slaves brought wealth planters in the Sugar Parishes, but it also
brought anxiety. In nearly every rural, sugar-producing parish, slaves outnumbered whites (only
in Lafourche did whites slightly edge out slaves as the majority). In addition to persistent fear off
slave resistance or rebellion, whites in rural South Louisiana were charged with the task of
managing a huge population. In the interest of protecting their investments and (in the cases of
the whites who did not own slaves) perpetuating the racial hierarchy, sugar parishioners,
regardless of slave owning status, served on slave watches and police juries. Every white resident
of the Sugar Parishes benefitted economically from slavery and the institutions continued growth
in the region. Wary of sectional agitation that may threaten slavery, sugar parishioners voted in
favor of compromise with the North. For example, in the 1844 and 1848 elections, Sugar
Parishes‘ voters gave big majorities to Henry Clay and Zachary Taylor in their respective
presidential races, in a stand against Texas annexation and in favor of a slavery compromise for
western territories.66
Not all white residents of the Sugar Parishes owned slaves or planted sugar, and few
owned the largest sugar plantations, but all white sugar parishioners were invested in the survival
of sugar communities. Most white sugar parishioners lived on small farms rather than the large
sugar plantations. The 1860 census shows that in Assumption Parish, nearly two-thirds of farms
spanned less than 50 acres, and nearly a third were less than twenty acres. Just eight percent of
farms were located on more than 500 acres. In Terrebonne Parish, 70 percent of farms were on
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less than 50 acres, while fewer than seven percent were larger than 500 acres. Even in sparsely
populated West Baton Rouge, one in three farmed on less than 50 acres while one in five farmed
on large plantations. While just a small percentage of the white population of rural South
Louisiana belonged to the wealthy planter class, small farmers, merchants, craftsmen, and
laborers all played a role in sugar production. The sugar communities lacked the ethnic and
religious divides of New Orleans. Instead, sugar parishioners bridged the Catholic and
Protestant, Creole and American divide professionally, socially, and even in marriage. Isolation,
dependence upon one another, and shared economic interest created an ethnically and religiously
egalitarian society—at least amongst the white planter elite. 67
Rural South Louisiana developed a unique system of trade and interdependence between
large plantations and small farms. For years, historians charged that southern planters greedily
threw all of their resources toward their staple crops without consideration of self-sufficiency;
Kenneth Stamp accused planters of growing ―not even enough corn and pork to feed their
slaves.‖ More recently, though, historians have revisited the data and found that the sugar region
had very little net import of grain or meat from outside of the region. The farming communities
achieved this by dividing production. The plantations utilized their large slave force to harvest
sugar and grains in different seasons, while smaller farms raised a surplus of meat. Farmers
could then buy and sell their surplus meat and grain locally with less overhead and with less
market fluctuations than they would have with imported food. Plantations depended on small
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farms as a source of food, and the small farms depended on sugar planting as a source of
income.68
Unions between the white population of the Sugar Parishes extended beyond economic
interdependence to social and religious life as well. Unlike New Orleans, the white residents of
the Sugar Parishes regularly breeched the ethnic divide in their home life. Intermarriage between
Creoles, Acadians, and Americans built familial bonds and helped the wealthiest farmers to forge
a planter class. In the decades that followed the Louisiana Purchase, one in five weddings in
some parishes were between Americans and Creoles. Planters and farmers worshipped together,
too. Relaxed religiosity in the remote parishes meant that Creoles and Americans attended
Catholic and Protestant churches together—or at least the women and children did. Sarah Russell
asserts that ―men of the sugar planter class rarely indulged in the anxieties of the staunchly
faithful.‖ Planter men escorted their families to worship, and then ―left hurriedly to pursue more
entertaining engagements.‖ 69
White men of the planter class, as leaders of their communities, joined political clubs to
support local and national candidates. These organizations were as much social clubs as they
were political; in addition to hosting campaign speeches, clubs hosted barbecues and hunts for its
members and dances for their families. Political clubs became the center of social life, and the
lines between political, social, and business alliances blurred. Both Americans and Creoles
joined the same political clubs. For example, Whig supporters known as the Centerville Rough
and Ready Club in St. Mary Parish had about even numbers of Creoles and Americans in support
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of Zachary Taylor‘s 1848 presidential bid, as did the Democratic group, The Granite Club of
Iberville Parish. Political clubs in the Sugar Parishes closely watched the ethnically partisan
politics of New Orleans, but they did not partake in the ethnic division themselves. 70
While the rural parishes of South Louisiana shared economic interests, similar
demographics, and shared many of the same political clubs, the parishes never voted together as
a unified bloc. Throughout the 1830‘s and 1840‘s the parishes varied from having a large
Democrat majority to having a large Whig majority. In the 1848 election, for example,
Plaquemines Parish gave nearly two-thirds of its votes to Democrat Lewis Cass and Lafourche
gave more than two-thirds of votes to Whig Zachary Taylor despite the similar geography,
proximity, and ethnic background. While more than half of all political races in the Sugar
Parishes voted for Whig candidates (but in no election did every parish vote Whig), the parishes
did not vote Whig at the same rates. Furthermore, their voting habits changed over time, and
parishes that voted for Whig candidates in one election did not necessarily vote for that party in
subsequent elections.
In the 1840, 1844, and 1848 presidential elections, a majority of Sugar Parishes gave
their support to the Whigs, but the party began losing popularity by the 1852 election. In 1840,
Plaquemines and Assumption Parishes were the only two rural South Louisiana parishes with
Democratic majorities. In the 1844 Presidential election, Plaquemines was again solidly
Democratic (though some argued that this was due to scandal), and that party had won by a small
margin in Ascension. The 1848 presidential election was virtually the same as the ‘44 election,
with the exception that Whig Zachary Taylor won Ascension by a small margin. In 1852, though,
Whig dominance waned. In that year‘s presidential election, Iberville, Ascension, Assumption,
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and Plaquemines all went to the Democrats. Additionally, St. Mary, Terrebonne, and St. Martin
voted for the Whig candidate at a much lower rate than previous years. The growing antipathy
that Sugar Parishes‘ voters felt toward the Whigs corresponded with the national sentiment, and
the local Whig party never recovered to their previous popularity after losing the 1852 election.71
The sudden collapse of the state and national party left the Whig planters and their
political clubs without a party to support. Some Whigs used the opportunity to reinvent
themselves as Democrats, but most still harbored resentment for the Democrats. These Whigs
without a party needed a new group to support. They got their wish early in 1854, when KnowNothing club nominated their ―Independent Reformer‖ ticket in New Orleans for a city election
that March. Many of the former Whigs gave their support to that Know-Nothing backed group.
Just days after the Know-Nothings announced their intentions to run in New Orleans, the
Southern Sentinel of Plaquemine—a Whig vehicle and Iberville‘s largest newspaper—gave the
new party its sympathies, as did the Thibodaux Minerva, a French-language newspaper from
Lafourche.72
Other newspaper took an opposing position to the new party. Pro-Democrat newspapers
from the region approached the new party with suspicion. The Pionier de l’Assomption, a
French-language Democratic newspaper from Napoleonville, was quick to denounce the new
party. The Pionier observed the nativist and anti-Catholic stance of East Coast Know-Nothings
and accused the local party of similar atrocities. Lucy‘s Avant-Courreur, the official newspaper
of St. Charles Parish, bemoaned the election violence that accompanied the Know-Nothings.
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Both accusations had some validity. In most parts of the country, the Know-Nothings were both
violent and anti-Catholic nativists. On top of that, the 1854 New Orleans election, which the
Sugar Parishes‘ newspapers followed obsessively, was not immune to violence at the polling
places.73
Pro-Whig papers (which quickly became pro-Know-Nothing newspapers) responded by
dispelling charges of anti-Catholicism amongst Louisiana‘s American Party. The Southern
Sentinel claimed that, while it was true that the Know-Nothings elsewhere subscribed to religious
intolerance, the local party condemned it. The Sentinel went on to claim opponents overstated the
party‘s anti-Catholicism to pit ―Catholics against Protestants and Protestants against
Catholics…merely done through political tact, nothing more—done by the Democratic Press to
catch the sympathies in Catholic regions. It is wholly untrue that the Order is opposed to
Catholics or any other religious denomination.‖ The Minerva assured its readers that a KnowNothing plank to proscribe Catholicism would soon be overturned at a national convention, and
thus it was irrelevant.74
The Know-Nothings in the Sugar Parishes never subscribed to the anti-Catholicism of the
national party because the region was too Catholic for an anti-Catholic party to win elections.
According to the 1850 census, the parishes of Ascension, Assumption, Iberville, Lafourche,
Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Martin, St. Mary,
Terrebonne, and West Baton Rouge contained a combined 22 Catholic churches out of a total of
39 churches. Not only did the Catholic churches outnumber protestant churches in the Sugar
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Parishes, but the total accommodations of the churches outnumbered the accommodations of
protestant churches, 13,290 to 7,265. In Assumption, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, and St.
John the Baptist, Catholic churches were the sole places of worship listed in the census. In West
Baton Rouge, the census listed one Catholic church and one Protestant church, but the Catholic
church could accommodate 500 people to the Protestant church‘s 200. The ratio of churches and
accommodation of churches in the Sugar Parishes would suggest that Catholics outnumbered
non-Catholics in the Sugar Parishes.75
The Know-Nothings in Southeast Louisiana tried to stay attractive to Creoles while
simultaneously preaching nativism. The American Party in the Sugar Parishes attracted a fair
number of Catholic Creoles to their ranks. In the 1854 town election in Plaquemine, the party
nominated Zenom LaBauve and Alfred Greaud—both Catholic—as selectmen. In 1855 KnowNothings in Lafourche nominated Catholic candidates for clerk, assessor and state senate. Later
that year, the Know-Nothing convention nominated Catholic J.D. Duralde of West Baton Rouge
for state treasurer. While the Know-Nothings in the Sugar Parishes avoided the issue of Catholic
Proscription, they embraced the doctrine of nativism. The party claimed that recent immigrants
were easily corruptible and unworthy of government representation. They advocated for twentyone years residency requirement before an immigrant could be naturalized. The Southern
Sentinel wrote that the ―political object of the Association is to destroy the influence of foreign
vote in our election of every description.‖ The Thibodaux Minerva declared that the American
Party‘s goal was to insure that ―the rightful sovereigns of the country—the native born—will in
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the future be permitted to attend the polls without being knocked down and mutilated by
worthless vagabonds.‖76
Such anti-immigrant rhetoric did not threaten the success of the party because rural South
Louisiana did not experience a wave of immigration in the 1830‘s and 1840‘s. The 1860 census
lists less than ten percent of the free, white population in the Sugar Parishes as foreign born, and
many of those had lived in the United States for decades. In Assumption and Terrebonne
Parishes, just one in twenty free whites were born abroad. The number of immigrants stayed did
not change much in the late 1840‘s, which suggests that most of the foreign born were not of the
Irish and German pauper stock that had settled in New Orleans. The number of foreign born in
the Sugar Parishes was relatively low; in total in Louisiana more than one in five was foreign
born. By the mid nineteenth century, not enough immigrants had settled in the Sugar Parishes to
be politically relevant.77
The Know-Nothing party gained popularity in the Sugar Parishes at different times. The
towns of Plaquemine and Thibodaux elected Know-Nothing tickets in local elections as early as
April of 1854. By May, 1854, the Sentinel, published in Iberville, stopped reporting news of the
Whigs and it began exclusively covering the American Party. Elsewhere, the Whig party
survived for another year before former Whigs left to join the Know-Nothings or Democrats.
During the state election in 1855, the Whigs Party failed to pull any delegates from the Sugar
Parishes to a convention. Thereafter, Whigs completely disappeared in remaining municipal and
judicial election in the region, as it had been entirely supplanted by the Know-Nothings.
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The American party in the Sugar Parishes, like its Whig predecessors, drew conservative,
wealthy planters to its ranks. Men like Henry Watkins Allen of West Baton Rouge, J. B.
Robinson of Terrebonne, and Theodore Hunt (who hailed from New Orleans but sought to
represent the Sugar Parishes as a US congressman) attracted voters in the Sugar Parishes for
three reasons. First, they did not stir the pot of the pending sectional crisis. Second, they sought
programs to protect sugar planters‘ interest. Third, party leaders fanned nativist flames in their
districts.
When it came to national politics, Know-Nothings of the Sugar Parishes tended to be
pragmatic Unionists who were willing to give some concessions to Northern anti-slavery
interests to protect slavery in the South. Theodore Hunt‘s condemnation of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act dissented from the majority opinion in the South. In 1855, Hunt delivered a speech at a
Know-Nothing barbecue in Houma where he declared that the South had little to gain by the
repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The North could not sustain a plantation economy anyway,
so the risk of stoking the anti-slavery flame was not worth the reward of slavery‘s expansion. A
year later, Henry Watkins Allen spoke in support of Fillmore‘s Know Nothing presidential
candidacy by painting Fillmore as a cure for sectionalism. Allen declared that Fillmore‘s
previous stint as president, ―left the country prosperous and happy; his compromise resolutions
had healed the unfortunate sectional differences that previously existed, while his foreign policy
had secured peace in all the world. Alas! How changed within a few years. In this very moment
there is a civil war in our own country—American blood is daily shed by American hands. The
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end is not yet—Civil war may continue to rage until state after state be involved…Who strikes
for Union? Friend, whoever though art, I am with thee.‖78
Party leaders sought to protect sugar planters‘ interests, especially within the state. One
of Allen‘s first acts after declaring his loyalty to the American Party was to take on the
merchants of New Orleans to preserve profits for the planters. The city‘s ports allocated limited
space for planters to store their sugar, which limited the amount they could sell at one time.
When Allen threatened to open another port to compete with New Orleans, the city gave in to the
planters‘ interests. In other instances, first in1856 and again 1857, cotton Democrats fought to
repeal—or at least reduce—the tariff from which sugar planters had long profited, Americans
Allen and J. B. Robinson championed the defense of protection, declaring protecting the tariff
their highest priority. Both sides supported government assistance for internal improvement,
especially railroads. The 1852 Constitution allowed for an unrivaled decade of rail construction
in the state after a virtual moratorium under the 1845 constitution. Because the Whigs had
authored the 1852 constitution, and by the nature of more Whigs joining the Americans than the
Democrats, the Americans gave the illusion that they had a stronger resume for internal
improvements than the Democrats. Know-Nothings in the Sugar Parishes had inherited the
American System from their Whig predecessors.79
In the Sugar Parishes, party leaders defended—rather than downplay—the nativism of the
national Know-Nothings. Theodore Hunt‘s speech at Houma embodied the Know-Nothing
motto, ―America for Americans,‖ and provided insight on Sugar Parishes‘ Know-Nothings
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stance on immigration. In the speech, Hunt spoke about the changing role of American
immigration law and how immigrants of the 1840‘s and 1850‘s were not like earlier immigrants.
According to Hunt, America‘s first naturalization laws were enacted to incorporate a few
thousand highly talented people from abroad. The laws ―invited foreigners to settle in the
country; and for the purpose of attracting good men to society, they superadded to the other
inducements the privilege of citizenship.‖ Subsequently, the number of pauper immigrants had
gotten out of control, and ―this extraordinary and unexpected increase shows that naturalization
laws could no longer serve the purpose for which they were intended.‖ For Hunt, the goal of the
Americans‘ nativism was to prevent from voting, ―aliens who will have no interest in the soil,
and who may just have escaped the prisons of Europe, or who will not understand the first
principles of our government.‖ Many Creole sugar parishioners were willing to accept this
nativism despite being ethnically non-American because the restrictions that the Know-Nothings
proposed did not affect their right to vote. By definition, Creoles were the descendants of the
French and Spanish who resided in Louisiana prior to statehood. By the 1850‘s all Creoles were
either native-born citizens, or they had lived in Louisiana long enough to meet even the
lengthiest naturalization restrictions. Through their decades of economic and social connections
with the ethnic Americans, many Creoles found more in common with their Anglo neighbors
than newcomers from Europe.80
Know-Nothings in the Sugar Parishes did not see nativism and adherence to the
American System‘s commercialist ideology as independent issues. To Know-Nothings,
Democrats stood in the way of the commercial growth, and they used immigrants‘ votes as a
tool. The editor of the Minerva wrote that recent immigrant voted as ―the paid hirelings of some
80
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moneyed demagogue,‖ in contrast to Know-Nothings who understood that ―the country is
deeply, directly, and indirectly interested in the future welfare of our great commercial mart.‖
Sugar Parishes‘ Know-Nothings believed that their party inherited the American System; this is
evident in the way the presses treated political candidates. For example, before the 1855 election,
Democratic newspapers declared that their congressional candidate, Miles Taylor, boasted a
strong Anti-Know-Nothing stance. The Minerva responded by claiming that Taylor was actually
quite friendly to the Know-Nothing cause as he ―announced himself the advocate of a Protective
Tariff, and a National Bank.‖ Not only were these causes friendly to the American Party, but
Know-Nothings believed they were anti-Democratic.81
The Democratic press did not attack these American Party leaders‘ positions, but instead
they repeated their assertion that Know-Nothings harbored anti-Catholic positions. Sugar
Parishes‘ Democrats could not find any compelling issues upon which they could oppose the
Americans without abandoning some of their rural constituency except to attack the KnowNothings‘ perceived religious intolerance. These assaults on the party started early in the local
party‘s existence, and they continued until after the Know-Nothings went in to decline following
the 1856 elections. During the summer of 1854, Napoleonville newspaper Pioneer de
l’Assomption declared that the Know-Nothings ran against Democrats by being the anti-Catholic
party, implying that the Democrats were a party for Catholics—claims that few Democratic
candidates would be willing to make. A year later, Lucy‘s Avant-Courreur, published in St.
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Charles Parish, covered the American Party‘s national convention by focusing on the meetings
treatment of Catholic delegates rather than on the platform that the party produced.82
These accusations put the Americans on the defensive throughout the party‘s existence.
The editors of Plaquemine‘s Southern Sentinel declared very early in the local party‘s existence
that the Americans sought change in immigrant voting laws, ―but if [Know-Nothings] go further,
and have religious as well as political reformations, we cannot side with this other aim and must
condone it.‖ Twenty days after Thibodaux‘s Minerva first acknowledged the existence of KnowNothing in Louisiana, the editor already addressed the bad reputation that Democratic press gave
the group with claims of religious proscription. With no small amount of irony, Minerva
countered accusations by claiming that the American Party held Catholic Creoles to a higher
regard than the Democrats did. During the 1855 gubernatorial election, the Americans nominated
more Creoles to statewide posts than the Democrats, a fact not lost on the Minerva. ―Which party
has shown the Creole portion of our population the most respect, [sic] the K.N.‘s or the

Anties,‖ the editor asked. ―The American looks to place of birth only, and not whether
the candidate is of an English, French, Spanish, or Italian parentage.‖83
Catholic majorities in a parish did not seem to dissuade them from voting for the KnowNothings. The American Party in the Sugar Parishes actually experienced more success in the
more heavily Catholic Parishes than it did in the more heavily Protestant parishes. Some of the
most Catholic parishes gave their support to the Know-Nothings; of the five Sugar Parishes with
the highest ratio of Catholic church accommodations to their total white population in the 1860
census, three—St. Mary, St. James, and St. Martin—voted for the Know-Nothing candidate in
82
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the 1856 presidential election. St. James voted for the Know-Nothing candidate despite the fact
that two-thirds of the total church accommodations in the parish were Catholic. Among the five
with the fewest Catholic accommodations, only St. Charles voted for the American Party. This
data suggests that Catholics were no less likely than non-Catholics to vote for the Know-Nothing
candidate.84
The number of planters in an area did not determine who voted for Know-Nothings
either. Six non-urban parishes (which therefore excludes Jefferson and Plaquemines parish) in
Southeast Louisiana voted for the Fillmore ticket during the 1856 presidential election: St.
Bernard, St. James, St. Martin, St. Mary, Terrebonne, and West Baton Rouge. The size of farms
in these parishes varied greatly. In Terrebonne, more than 72 percent of farms extended more
than one hundred acres—the most of any of the Sugar Parishes. However, in St. Bernard and
Terrebonne, only 19 percent and 23 percent, respectively, of farms stretched beyond one hundred
acres. The Parish with the second highest percentage of large farms, St. Charles, where 56
percent of farms were over one hundred acres, voted Democratic, as did Ascension and
Lafourche, where less than a quarter of farms were large. Land wealth of the voters did not seem
to affect the popularity of the American Party.85
Nor did the number of foreign-born affect the election outcomes. Outside of the suburban
areas in Jefferson and Plaquemines Parishes near New Orleans, the foreign born population
hardly constituted more than one in ten of the white population in any of the Sugar Parishes. The
parishes that voted for Know-Nothing candidates ran the gamut from almost negligible number
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of foreign born to just over ten percent foreign born. Those that voted Democrat also varied
within that range. Democratic Ascension, Assumption, Iberville, Lafourche, and St. John the
Baptist counted 8.7 percent, 4.8 percent, 10.9 percent, 7.6 percent, and 10.8 percent of their
white population, respectively, as foreign born. American Party backing St. James, St. Martin,
St. Mary, Terrebonne, and West Baton Rouge had 7.7 percent, 6.7 percent, 13 percent, 5.2
percent, and 9.4 percent foreign-born. There was no pattern that could suggest that the ratio of
immigrants to total population played any role in the election.86
In the 1855 state election—the election in which the Know-Nothings enjoyed the most
success in the Sugar Parishes—sugar parishioners tended to vote for a party rather than
individual candidates. Voters tended to select straight party tickets with concern for neither
ethnicity nor religion of the candidates. The number of votes for Derbigny was virtually the
same as the number of votes for the American Party‘s candidates for Lieutenant Governor,
Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, Attorney General, and Superintendent of Education. For
example, in Assumption Parish, Derbigny and Texada both received 238 votes, Duralde and
Beale both received 235, and Roseman, Randall Hunt, and Stillman received 236. In Lafourche,
Derbigny received 415 votes, Texada received 401, Beale 392, Duralde 396, Roseman 394,
Randall Hunt 410, and Stillman, 396.87
Within the parishes, voting districts tended to vote heavily toward one party or the other.
In Lafourche, five of the sixteen voting districts gave over 80 percent of the votes to one party in
the 1855 state election. Another seven districts gave more than two-thirds of their votes to one
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party. In Assumption, three of the fourteen districts voted unanimously for a party—one district
voted entirely American and two voted entirely Democratic. In six other of Assumptions
districts, one party received less than ten total votes. Interestingly, how one district voted did not
affect how others voted. For example, while Lafourche‘s 13th precinct voted in favor of the
Democrats 44-2 during the 1855 election, the nearby 15th precinct voted American 43-16. In
Assumption, the fifth ward voted 37-0 for the Americans, while the sixth voted 139-9 for the
Democrats. It is also noteworthy that even in the rural, remote Sugar Parishes, the cities were the
most politically contentious places. The closest race in Lafourche occurred in Thibodaux, where
Americans won 142 (a third of their total votes in the parish) to 131.88
The best determining factor as to how a parish voted in the 1855 and 1856 elections was
whether they had voted Whig or Democrat in previous elections. While it is true that both Whigs
and Democrats voted for and ran with the American Party, in the Sugar Parishes, the number of
Whigs who went to the American Party was much higher than the number of Democrats. This
fact can be seen when looking at the parishes with American majorities in the 1856 presidential
race. No parish that had voted for a Democratic candidate in either the 1848 election or the 1852
election had an American majority in 1856. The five rural Sugar Parishes that voted for the
American Party in the 1856 presidential election—West Baton Rouge, St. James, St. Mary, St.
Martin, and Terrebonne—had all given more than 60 percent of their votes to Whigs in 1844,
1848, and 1852 presidential elections. In contrast, only Lafourche and St. John the Baptist
parishes had given more than 60 percent of their votes to Whigs and 1852 and voted Democratic
in 1856.89
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While the American Party in New Orleans was a reform minded alternative to the
Democrats, and in the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana, the Americans were anti-Catholic
nativists, the Americans in the Sugar Parishes was little more than a continuation of the Whigs of
the area. Sugar parishioners joined the American Party because their society needed divisive
politics. They needed more than one party so that they could have a system of political alliances
and clubs. Politics was a leisure activity and the basis of business and family connections. The
perseverance of an anti-Democratic party in that region remained important to continue the
planter lifestyle. When the Whigs declined in the early 1850‘s the anti-Democrats became
Americans and took on some of the language of that group. Since immigration was irrelevant in
the region, they adopted nativism. Since anti-Catholicism was unpopular, the group rejected that
tenet. The American party in the region showed tendencies toward Unionism, protection, and
preservation of the planter economy.
Ultimately, these American Party programs did not separate the party from the
Democrats. Enough former Whigs had gone to the Democratic Party to give the Democrats
majorities in the 1855 and 1856 elections. By the end of 1856, the Americans in the Sugar
Parishes were in the same position as the Whigs in ‘52: their party was quickly losing their
ability to represent the Sugar Parishes in national politics and the national party split over the
expansion of slavery. By the 1857 state convention, most Know-Nothings in the Sugar Parishes
had abandoned their party and had joined the Democrats.
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Chapter 3: North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes
If the national parties of the Second Party system amounted to, as historians have
suggested, a loose alliance of locally minded politicians who gathered every four years to select a
presidential candidate, it should also be said that in Louisiana, parties played a similar role.
While both northern and southern Louisiana shared some key ideology—namely the importance
of protecting slavery—the people and political tendencies of North Louisiana and the Florida
Parishes were occasionally incompatible with those of their fellow Louisianans to the south. For
Louisianans in the Florida Parishes and in North Louisiana, politics served two purposes: to
preserve the lifestyle of ethnically American North Louisianans, and to counter the political
power of New Orleans.
When the American Party reached North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes, political
actors in the regions used the party to continue their struggle against the old political power
structure of New Orleans. The people of the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana saw
themselves as the antithesis to their counterparts to the south; they were much more likely to be
internal immigrants from the Southern United States, less likely to be Catholic, and they were
less economically dependent on New Orleans than the sugar parishioners. When voting, they
tended to support people from their own regions without strong party consideration. North
Louisianans already had a tendency toward nativism and anti-Catholicism before the American
party organized in the regions. Because they dominated the religious culture of North Louisiana
and the Florida Parishes, Protestants in the northern parts of the state felt less inclined to appease
Catholics in their politics. The American Party in the Florida Parishes and in the Northwest of
the state more closely resembled the American Party in the rest of the South rather than that of
New Orleans. Cities as near to the Catholic, Sugar Parishes as Baton Rouge—just across the
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river from West Baton Rouge Parish and north of Ascension, bred a virulent wave of antiCatholicism as Know-Nothingism spread through the regions.
North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes are not geographically linked, and the regions
run the gamut between rural and urban, but the Know-Nothings in these regions were similar:
nativist and anti-Catholic. They were more like the Know-Nothings in the rest of the South than
they were to the Know-Nothings in New Orleans and South Louisiana. The American Party in
North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes did not adhere to the special brand of KnowNothingism that was more popular in the southern part of the state because nativism was not as
much of a liability in the northern regions as it was the southern regions. North Louisiana and the
Florida Parishes had many fewer naturalized citizens than South Louisiana, a smaller percent of
its population was Catholic, and many more were Americans born out of the state. As a result,
the American Party in northern Louisiana more closely adhered to the national party‘s tenets than
southern Louisiana.
None of this implies that North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes ever voted as a
regional coalition, but rather it suggests that the American Party had common values across the
two regions. North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes had parishes in each region giving strong
support to Democrats, some to Americans, and even as late as 1856, some places gave majorities
to Whig candidates. Party majorities in the two regions often changed from election to election; a
parish that voted Democratic in a gubernatorial election did not necessarily vote that way in a
presidential election. North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes could not be pigeonholed as being
a party stronghold for any political party throughout the antebellum period.
In the years preceding 1854, two trends changed the political climate of North Louisiana
and the Florida Parishes: population growth changed the political importance of the two regions,
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and party realignment affected the regions‘ votes. At the beginning of statehood, North
Louisiana‘s sparse population constituted a small fraction of the state‘s total population. As the
region grew from internal immigration, North Louisiana‘s votes became more important for
deciding state elections. Meanwhile, the number of voters in the Florida Parishes stagnated early,
and the region‘s political importance diminished. The population shifts occurred while voters in
the northern regions of Louisiana shifted from Whig to Democrat majorities. As a result,
northern Louisianans did not have longtime loyalty to one party the way sugar parishioners had.
Both North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes had always been culturally American, and the
population growth in those regions had originated from elsewhere in the country. Joseph Tregle
declared that ―nowhere was the control of the Americans so complete as in the Florida Parishes.‖
Neither region had been home to large French speaking populations like in rural South
Louisiana, nor did they receive a large number of immigrants like in New Orleans.90
While the 1820 census showed that nearly a third of Louisiana‘s non-naturalized
residents lived in North Louisiana, this number is deceiving as nearly all of them lived in
Natchitoches. Only 38 of the 3,145 ―aliens‖ lived in the remaining parishes of North Louisiana.
In the 1850 census, which counted individuals born outside of the United States regardless of
their naturalized status, barely 2 percent of the state‘s immigrant population lived in North
Louisiana—at a time when 22 percent of the white population lived in those parishes. In that
same year, more than half of Louisiana‘s 61,920 people born in the U.S. but outside the state
resided in North Louisiana. 56 percent of the white population in that region came from
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elsewhere in the country; in Jackson Parish alone, nearly 71 percent of the white population
migrated from other states.91
Since statehood, the Florida Parishes and Northwest Louisiana had more
demographically, economically, and politically in common with the surrounding states of
Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas than they did with New Orleans and the Sugar Parishes. The
residents of the more northern parts of the state were from the same protestant, American stock
as their neighbors in the surrounding states. Planters in these areas grew the same commodity—
cotton—as their neighbors to the north and east. The voters in North Louisiana and the Florida
Parishes opposed the tariff that their neighbors down river in southeast Louisiana supported. Like
their neighboring Gulf South states, voters in North Louisiana and the Florida parishes split
nearly evenly between Democrats and Whigs.92
Of Louisiana‘s free whites who were born in other states, most migrated to Louisiana
from elsewhere in the South. According to the state‘s register published in 1855, 44,697 of the
Louisiana‘s 60,447 whites born in other states—nearly three of every four—came from
Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky,
Arkansas, and Texas. Nearly a third of the population born-out-of-state migrated from Alabama
and Mississippi. The ratio of slave state migrants to northern migrants was higher in North
Louisiana and in the Florida Parishes, as a majority of the other 15,750 American migrants to the
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state lived in the more cosmopolitan New Orleans. In North Louisiana, the vast majority of
whites born outside of the state came from other slave states.93
The North Louisiana parishes‘ population growth outpaced the rest of the state in the
decades following statehood, and that region‘s political clout grew while the Florida parishes‘
populations stagnated. The 1820 census lists 11,603 free whites spread throughout Catahoula,
Concordia, Natchitoches, Ouachita, and Rapides parishes, which at that time constituted the
entire population of North Louisiana. This was less than 16 percent of the state‘s total white
population of 73,383 that year, putting the region behind Florida Parishes‘ 13,208, Orleans
Parish‘s 19,244, and South Louisiana‘s 29,328. North Louisiana‘s small population in the 1820
census belies the fact that the region stretches across nearly half of the state‘s 43,500 square
miles of habitable land with a population density of just .56 free whites per square mile. In the
1830 census, that density grew to .64 free whites per square mile. By 1840, the white population
in North Louisiana had more than doubled to 28,033, while the total state‘s white population had
increased by just over 75 percent, from 89,231 to 158,457. In the 1850 census, the North
Louisiana white population doubled again to 56,773 while the whole state grew by just over 61
percent to 255,491. North Louisiana‘s growth continued to outpace the rest of the state, and in
the 1860 census, the region had grown by 60 percent to 90,702, while the rest of the state‘s white
population growth of 40 percent to 357,456. North Louisiana‘s white population grew from
having less than 15 percent of the state‘s white population in 1830 to more than a quarter of all
white residents by 1860. Meanwhile, the white population of the Florida Parishes diminished as a
percentage of the state‘s total. The 1820 census records show that despite consisting just over 10

93

A. W. Bell, The State Register: Comprising an Historical and Statistical Account of Louisiana, from its
Earliest Settlement as a Territory, Down to its Present Period as a State; Together with an Accurate List of All State
and Parish Officers, (Baton Rouge: TBR Hatch & Co; 1855) 180-181.

71

percent of the state‘s total land, the Florida Parishes housed more than 18 percent of Louisiana‘s
white population. By 1830, fewer than one in six white Louisianans lived in the Florida Parishes.
By 1840, that ratio was down to 11 percent, and in 1850, just 9 percent of Louisiana‘s white
population lived in the Florida Parishes. The Florida Parishes population continued to growth
throughout the antebellum years, but they grew at a much slower pace than the rest of the state.94
Both regions remained overwhelmingly Protestant throughout this period of Louisiana‘s
population growth. Just six of the 66 Florida Parish churches listed in the 1850 Census were
Catholic, and three of those were in St. Tammany Parish. These Catholic churches held 2,140 of
the 14,520 total church accommodations in the Florida Parishes. By 1860, just eleven of the 113
churches, and 2,400 of the 26,575 church accommodations in the Florida Parishes were
Catholic—a decrease from 15 percent to fewer than 10 percent of the total seats. In 1850, North
Louisiana had eight Catholic churches with accommodation for 2,300 out of 137 total churches
with accommodations for 29,400. More than half of the Catholic churches and accommodations
in North Louisiana were located in Natchitoches alone. The 1860 census lists North Louisiana
with twenty-two Catholic Churches with accommodation for 7,550 out of a total 315 churches
and 86,866 accommodations—a slight increase from just under 8 percent to about 8 and a half
percent. Catholics were far smaller a percentage of the population in the Florida Parishes and
North Louisiana than in New Orleans or the Sugar Parishes (where the 1860 Census lists 45
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percent and 68 percent of total church accommodations were Catholic, respectively) and the
majority of Catholics in those regions lived in a few outlier parishes.95
The relative scarcity of Catholics in North Louisiana and Florida Parishes made antiCatholic nativism less of a political liability than elsewhere in the state, and thus antiCatholicism permeated local politics. The 1850 Census lists Catholics as just the fourth most
popular denomination in the Florida Parishes by total accommodation, after the Methodists,
Baptists, and Presbyterians, respectively. In North Louisiana, Catholicism was the third most
popular behind the Methodists and Baptists, but each of these denominations still had more than
five times as many accommodations as the Catholics. The relatively small number of Catholics
compared to other denominations affected the regions votes‘; in every gubernatorial race from
the beginning of statehood until 1855, whenever a Catholic ran against a Protestant, the North
Louisiana and Florida Parishes‘ voters chose the Protestant candidate with one exception.
Newspapers like Baton Rouge‘s Daily Advocate openly opined about the dangers of ―Papism‖ in
politics without fear of reprisal.96
Local representation in state politics to counter New Orleans‘ dominance proved more
important than party. From 1828 through 1852, a majority of North Louisiana and the Florida
Parishes voted Democratic. All parishes in the regions were pro-Jackson in the 1828 and 1832
elections. Jackson garnered over 92 percent of the votes in two of the Florida Parishes. After the
second American party system took hold in Louisiana‘s state politics in the mid 1830‘s,
Democrats won a majority of parishes in North Louisiana and Florida Parishes in all but one
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gubernatorial race. That race in 1838—which pit Democratic New Orleans mayor Denis Prieur
against Whig planter Andre Roman—split the Florida Parishes with three parishes giving
majorities to the Whigs and three to the Democrats, while three North Louisiana parishes gave
majorities to Roman and five to Prieur. Even in parishes where Prieur won a majority, the Whig
candidate had garnered more votes than in any previous election. John Sacher attributes the
success of the Whig candidate as the North Louisiana and Florida Parishes‘ reluctance to support
a New Orleanian.97
In subsequent elections, party ideology became less important for Florida Parishes‘ and
North Louisiana‘s voters than having local representation. The Florida Parishes and North
Louisiana successfully voted their own candidates in to statewide offices in the 1846 and 1849
elections. In 1846, they elected West Feliciana resident Isaac Johnson governor by great
margins—in the Florida Parishes, Johnson garnered two-thirds of the votes—alongside Joseph
Walker of Rapides for Treasurer and Charles Rowley of Concordia for Adjuster and Inspector
General. Again in 1849, Florida Parishes and the North Louisiana gave big majorities to
Democrat Joseph Walker from Rapides over the legislatively inexperienced, New Orleansconnected Creole lawyer, Alexandar Declouet, from St. Martin. Democrats‘ success in 1849
showed that party success in the northern parts of the state depended on building an illusion that
the party represented those regions and not just New Orleans.98
Three elections in 1852 proved that party ideology remained less important than who was
running: the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana both gave Democrats majorities in the
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presidential election, Democratic voters in both regions supported the Whig constitution
proposal, and the gubernatorial election was the closest in decades. The Democrat presidential
candidate, Franklin Pierce, had won North Louisiana‘s fourth congressional district by a
landslide, and only three parishes in the region—Concordia (by 35 votes), Morehouse (by 59
votes), and Madison (by 24 votes)—gave Winfield Scott a majority. The Third Congressional
District gave a nearly ten percent lead to the Democrat. The Whig-championed state constitution
proved to be much more popular; the measure gained an outright majority in the Third
Congressional District—which contained the Florida Parishes as well as some Sugar Parishes
and parts of the North. In the Fourth Congressional District—which contained the Northwest
quarter of the state—voted against the constitutional convention, but at a much smaller margin
than they voted against Whig politicians.99
The biggest benefit that the proposed constitution offered to the northern part of the state
was representation based on total population, both free and slave, for state government. Since the
agricultural North had a much higher percentage of its population enslaved, the new rules gave
the North more representation per free white than New Orleans. The importance of
representation for the parishes with a high percentage of their population enslaved should not be
understated; those North and Florida Parishes with relatively few slaves, like Calcasieu and
Livingston, where slaves constituted less than a quarter of the population, overwhelmingly
opposed the constitution. In most North Louisiana parishes where slavery was prevalent, even
those that voted Democratic, tended to support the Whig constitution. St. Helena, from
Louisiana‘s Third District, with nearly half its population enslaved, gave Democrat Franklin
Pierce a 248-209 victory over Winnfield Scott, but the parish voted 246-191 in favor of the Whig
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constitution. In Natchitoches, where slaves outnumbered whites, the Democratic presidential
candidate won with 407 votes against the Whig‘s 289, while voting in favor of the constitution,
438 to 236. In DeSoto Parish, 55 percent slave, the Democrat won the election by 47 votes, but
the new constitution won by 119 votes. In the North and Florida Parishes vote for the 1852 state
constitution, voters willingly voted against their party for the opportunity to regain political
power from New Orleans.100
Louisiana voted to adopt the 1852 constitution by a nearly 10 percent margin, and the
state election mandated by the constitution that followed showed more North and Florida
Parishes‘ antipathy to New Orleanian politics. During the Whig convention in Baton Rouge in
late November, just a single representative from the North or Florida Parishes voted for the New
Orleans-backed St. Landry native Louis Bordelon, who ultimately won the nomination. Instead,
the representatives from the northern regions split their vote between John Ray of Ouachita and
John Moore of St. Martin. The election a month later pitted Bordelon against Democrat Paul
Hebert of Iberville Parish. As neither gubernatorial candidate represented the North Louisianans
or the Florida parishioners, Hebert won the election by merely 356 votes in the Florida Parishes
and 740 votes in the North, in no small part because of his party‘s pro-North of William Wood
Farmer from Union for Lieutenant Governor and A.S. Heron as Secretary of State.101
While the Whig Party swerved off track throughout Louisiana in 1852, nowhere did the
wheels come off quite as far as they did in North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes. Politicians
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from these regions lost interest in the Whig party before the gubernatorial election even began.
At the Whig Convention, the parishes of St. Tammany, Washington, Livingston, Concordia,
Calcasieu, Rapides, Sabine, Natchitoches, Bossier, Caldwell, Bienville, Morehouse, Jackson,
Franklin, Madison, Carroll, and Winn failed to send any delegates. When two candidates—
George McWhorter of Concordia and Joseph Bernard of East Baton Rouge—received
nominations for the governorship, both rejected the nominations. While the Whigs did not face
total embarrassment in the North or Florida Parishes—they lost both regions by fewer than ten
percent of the vote—that was more attributable to the fact that the Democratic candidates were
nearly as unappealing to the North Louisiana‘s parishioners and Florida parishioners as the
Whigs‘ ticket.102
The Whig Party in the North experienced its final death throes in a two elections the
following year. In the first election, Democrat Thomas Slidell, of New Orleans, defeated Whig
Christian Roselius for Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court. Both candidates feigned
anti-partisanship, but their party affiliation became clear in the newspaper endorsements that
they gained. Slidell, with the stronger Democratic pedigree by nature of his brother being
Senator John Slidell, walloped his opponent 1027 to 764 in the Florida Parishes and 2203 to
1527 in North Louisiana‘s parishes. In November, North Louisiana again sent Whigs reeling.
Florida Parishes‘ voters elected Democrats in all three senate races, and the elected Democrats to
five of the nine open House offices. North Louisianans elected four Democrats in five senate
races, and nineteen Democrats in the 26 House races. As a result of the two elections,
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Louisiana‘s judiciary and congressional delegation joined the executive branch solidly in the
hands of Democrats.103
Nativism had never been particularly out of fashion in the northern reaches of the state,
but by 1853, it experienced a particularly noteworthy revival. Whigs faced a particular dilemma
whether to embrace nativism as an attempt to win some races in the North, knowing that the
southern part of the state had less of an appetite for it. Christian Roselius campaigned in the
regions with the claim that he was a truer Native American and friendlier to extending residency
requirements for enfranchisement than his opponent. He justified residence extensions by
claiming that they equalized all Louisiana residents. A political ally of Roselius explained that
native-born Americans had to live in the nation for a certain number of years before voting (by
nature of age restrictions), and foreign-born residents should too. Pro-Roselius newspapers in
New Orleans made the effort to reject claims that their candidate harbored Native American
sentiment, but in the North, Roselius supporters embraced the stance.104
While the American Party did not enter the Louisiana political arena until the Jackson
Square Americans announced their reform party in New Orleans, Know-Nothing lodges almost
certainly existed in North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes before then. In late 1853 and early
1854, popularity of anti-Catholicism in cities like Baton Rouge where the native-born, protestant
residents already watched their political representation wane as their parish failed to grow
rapidly like New Orleans. Northerners did not need to live in proximity to the Catholic
immigrant paupers to feel that their religion threatened Louisiana. Some in the Florida Parishes
bemoaned the sad state of Irish immigrants, and blamed their religion. The Baton Rouge Weekly
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Comet blamed Catholicism for the high number of illiterate white men in Louisiana. According
to the paper, ―the Church on one side (the side of Rome) [sic] feels that its strength lies in the
weakness (intellectually) of the people.‖ Catholicism was incompatible with the free thinking
that democracy demanded of its citizens. The fact that this sentiment arose when it did—at the
end of 1853 and in January, 1854 corresponds too much with the spread of Know-Nothing
wigwams to be coincidental.105
Newspapers in North Louisiana became aware of the Know-Nothings by the end of 1853,
and they reported about the American Party as early as March, 1854, but local politicians did not
declare themselves as Know-Nothings until statewide elections pitted them against the
naturalized-supported New Orleans Democratic political power. As in New Orleans, the group in
Baton Rouge declared themselves to be independent reformers. Nativist newspapers quickly
endorsed the reformers. The Comet declared ―the weight of our prosperity depends on their
wisdom, and integrity; and therefore such as have a deep and permanent interest in our lovely
little city, should be alone accepted. We cannot see for our life, how it is that a man‘s calling
himself a Democrat or a Whig, has anything to do with it.‖ Former party membership mattered
less than whether the candidate had long time residency and investment in the community.106
The Know-Nothing party meant different things for different people in the northern
regions of the state, but preeminently, the group used their nativism to attack New Orleans‘
Democratic political power structure. The regions had relatively few foreign-born whites to
affect local politics; the Know-Nothings there worried about Orleans and Jefferson Parishes‘—
home to nearly 90 percent of the foreign born in the state—affect on state elections. Caddo
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Parish had hardly 200 foreign born whites living within its boundaries in 1850, but a KnowNothing newspaper in Shreveport bemoaned the foreign influence in Louisiana politics.
Likewise, less than ten percent of the 1850 white population in East Baton Rouge emigrated to
the United States, but the Comet insisted on declaring that ―the making, interpretation, and
execution of laws, cannot be intrusted [sic] to those who are ignorant of our constitutional
safeguard—who are ignorant of our established statues [sic], and who are ignorant of the temper
of the American people.‖ The northern regions‘ attack on foreign influence was a thinly veiled
attack on New Orleans‘ influence.107
In addition to using nativism to minimize New Orleans‘ political reach, the group used
nativism in the defense of slavery. Many in the northern parts of the state recognized that
keeping slavery‘s status quo depended on a continued balance of power between slave and free
states, and immigration skewed this balance. ―Upon consulting census reports,‖ claimed the
South-Western, ―it finds that three-fourths of the Irish emigration stays in New England and the
middle states, where commercial and manufacturing interests are seated, and are found in the
South only where there are great public works in construction. In this way, it is gradually
effecting [sic] the balance of power in the Union.‖ Furthermore, the slaveholders feared that
immigrants could also import antislavery sentiment. ―Abolitionism is a fanaticism of foreign
birth,‖ the South-Western claimed. The Comet agreed and went further to argue that the
Democrats, nationally, courted antislavery people to their ranks. In 1854, the American Party
was just months old, and had yet to take a stance on slavery on a national level. Americans, by
nature of the newness of their party, gained immunity—at least initially—on the slavery
question. The party took a proslavery position in the South and an antislavery position in the
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North, and the factions got along harmoniously as long as they did not have to acknowledge one
another.108
Another reason that they became popular was that the Know-Nothing Party in the North
and the Sugar Parishes featured genuine anti-Catholicism in its ranks—an aspect that made them
unique among the party in Louisiana. The pro-protestant group declared their loyalty to the
national group instead of the rogue New Orleans-led pro-Catholic faction of the party.
Americans in the northern sections of the state declared themselves, ―proud to stand, with
complete stight [sic] outness and flat footedness, upon the whole Philadelphia platform, and
especially upon the anti-Catholic Plank thereof.‖ The northern regions of the state dispatched
their own ―Simon Pure‖ delegation to national conventions to send the message that not all of
Louisiana supported the pro-Catholic delegation from New Orleans. Democratic newspaper
picked up the dissenting messages within the American Party and quipped that the KnowNothings would inevitably fall apart from within if given enough time.109
Anti-Catholic Know-Nothings in North Louisiana justified religious proscription by
claiming that Catholics‘ loyalty to the pope and bishops was incompatible with republicanism.
Know-Nothings cited a ―politico-religious‖ system to which nativists assumed Catholics
belonged, in which national loyalty lie with Catholicism, and the sect acted as a nation state
without borders. Catholics, according to nativists, still followed popes and priests, ―unproductive
nobility.‖ ―Republican politics and the Catholic Religion,‖ the Comet claimed, ―have never been
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known to travel peaceably together.‖ Catholics could not be subjects to two governments, and
their unwillingness to convert showed their loyalties.110
Despite their success in elections—especially in the Florida Parishes—the Americans in
the northern sections split in two factions over their support of the pro-Catholic state platform.
One group, the Simon Pures, led by Comet founder and editor George Pike of Baton Rouge,
accused the more Catholic-sympathetic Know-Nothings of simply being Whigs without party
and subsidiaries of New Orleans. Opposite the Simon Pures, another faction of Americans in the
northern regions conceded support to the South Louisiana branch of the party in the interest of a
unified party to challenge Democrats. Those in the faction that supported the state ticket were no
less anti-Catholic, they just downplayed the candidates‘ Catholicism. For example, anti-Catholic
supporters of the state Know-Nothing Party, according to Democratic newspapers, justified their
support by claiming that gubernatorial candidate Derbigny was really a ―Protestant Catholic‖
who secretly despised Catholicism. Democrats took advantage of the schism within the party as a
sign that the American party would inevitably fall apart. ―Dissention and troubles continue,‖ one
Democratic newspaper opined on the state of Know-Nothings in Louisiana, ―to distract the
doughty warriors of the K.N. wigwam. The ‗pipe of peace‘ is no longer a ‗pipe of piece,‘ but one
of many pieces.‖111
Pike and the Simon Pures sought to bring the Americans in line with the national group
by purging the state party of old Catholic Whigs who joined the Americans by default as the
Whigs ceased to convene. The Baton Rouge Advocate, a Democratic newspaper, recounted the
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story of a man, ―J.D.‖ (probably J.V. Duralde, a popular Sugar Parishes politician) who had been
a longtime supporter, ―financially and otherwise,‖ of the Whigs. When the Whigs became KnowNothings, the Advocate claims, the Catholic J.D. became a ―member of no party‖—a fact with
which Duralde, who had just gained the American Party‘s nomination for treasurer, may have
disagreed. The Simon Pure faction did not regard the American Party as successor to the Whigs,
but rather they believed that the group should be a non-partisan organization of members from
both political parties. The group nominated their own ticket for the 1855 state election that
contained both Whigs and Democrats, including Lieutenant Governor Robert Wickliffe, who
would go on in the election to win the governor‘s race as a Democrat, to keep the position of
Lieutenant Governor. The ticket, headed by Pike for governor, listed only ethnically American,
protestant candidates from the Florida Parishes for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of
State, Treasurer, Auditor, Superintendent of Education, and Attorney General. Thoroughly as
anti-New Orleans as it was nativist, the Simon Pure ticket failed to win most of its
nominations—only R.G. Beale of Baton Rouge gained a nomination for Secretary of State—at
the state convention.112
The Simon Pures spelled trouble for the state‘s American Party. Their existence gave
legitimacy to Democratic claims that Louisiana Know-Nothings harbored anti-Catholicism
despite American claims otherwise. The Southern, pro-Catholic faction of the party regarded the
Simon Pures as a black eye on the organization. Charles Gayarre tried to downplay the
prevalence of the Simon Pures in the north, claiming that the anti-Catholic faction totaled just
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―fifty low bred scoundrels.‖ Contrary to Gayarre‘s insistence, the Simon Pures organized in the
northern, Protestant, parishes of the state, such as the American Party council at Sparta, in
Bienville, where a group formally denounced that official State party‘s stance on anti
Catholicism and adopted the entire national platform. The two sides fought over which claimed
legitimacy—the faction that controlled the state convention, or the faction more closely aligned
with the national convention. Even more damaging for the state party, the schism fueled
Democrats‘ claims of Know-Nothing weakness and disorganization.113
Despite the fact that the convention rejected the Simon Pure ticket and platform, the
American Party fared reasonably well in the Florida Parishes. To the chagrin of the antiCatholics, the convention in New Orleans nominated several Creole Catholics, including the
party‘s candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, and treasurer. The South Louisiana wing of
the party garnered enough support to adopt a pro-Catholic platform, with the ninth plank meant
to silence the Simon Pures:
―While we approve of the platform adopted by the late national council of the American
Party at Philadelphia, we reject the application of the principles of the eighth article to the
American catholics, [sic] as unjust, unfounded, and entirely unworthy of our country. We
shall forever continue to protest against any abridgement of religious liberty, holding it as
a cardinal maxim that religious faith is a question between each individual and his God.
We utterly condemn any attempt to make religious belief a test for political office, and
can never affiliate with any party which holds sentiments not in accordance with these.‖
Despite these slights, the Know-Nothings gubernatorial candidate lost to his West Feliciananative opponent by just 13 votes in the Florida Parishes. In Louisiana‘s Third Congressional
District race, which encompassed the Florida Parishes as well as parishes in North and South
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Louisiana, the Know-Nothing candidate had won the Florida Parishes by 103 votes, but lost the
broader district.114
The Americans fared more poorly in the northern parishes. Derbigny lost to Wickliffe
there by 2,025 votes—nearly 14 percent of the electorate. In Louisiana‘s fourth Congressional
District, which contained Caldwell, Bienville, Winn, Rapides, Natchitoches, Sabine, Calcasieu,
De Soto, Bossier, Claiborne, Union, Ouachita, Franklin, Caddo, Jackson, and Morehouse
Parishes along with several parishes in Southwest Louisiana, the Know-Nothing congressional
candidate lost in the North Louisiana by more than 15 percent. Those northern Parishes in the
third district—Concordia, Catahoula, Tensas, Caroll, and Madison—gave their American Party
congressional candidate a slight edge (116 vote lead), but the Third District parishes to the south
tempered the vote, and the Democrats won that election.115
The American Party failed to win in North Louisiana during the state election for two
reasons: a new group, calling themselves Anti-Know-Nothings campaigned against the
American Party in the Fourth Congressional District, and with the defeat of the Simon Pures at
the state convention, the Americans chose a New Orleans dominated ticket. Anti-KnowNothings, also called anti-Americans by the Know-Nothing press, formed coalition tickets in
elections to attract former Whigs who became disillusioned by the nativism present in the
American Party. Anti-Know-Nothing tickets were essentially identical to Democratic tickets.
The group started as a means for the Democrats to make inroads in former Whig strongholds for
local and judicial elections by giving Whigs the option to support the Democratic candidate
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without having to feel like they were electing their old foe. Anti-Know-Nothing tickets were
essentially identical to Democratic tickets. Know-Nothing press dismissed the anti-KnowNothings as ―political missionaries,‖ who envied the spread of the American Party. It is difficult
to quantify how many former Whig votes the Anti-Know-Nothings brought to the Democrats,
but it can be assumed that if the Know-Nothings gained much of their support from former
Whigs, an alternative for old Whigs siphoned some of the party away from the KnowNothings.116
Many North Louisianans felt reluctant to support the American Party in the election
because the official state ticket contained several of their classic political foes—New Orleansbacked Catholics. Three Catholic Creole names sat atop the ticket: Charles Derbigny for
Governor, Louis Texada for Lieutenant Governor, and J. V. Duralde for Treasurer. As the son of
a former governor who had lived in greater New Orleans since Louisiana was a Spanish colony,
Derbigny lived in New Orleans his entire life. The Democratic ticket, on the other hand, featured
only two Creole names, no candidates from New Orleans, and five candidates from the Florida
Parishes and North Louisiana: Robert Wickliffe for Governor from West Feliciana, Andre
Hebron from East Baton Rouge for Secretary of State, Samuel F. Marks from West Feliciana for
auditor, C. E. Greneaux from Natchitoches for Treasurer, and Samuel Bard of Caroll for
Superintendent of Education. Democratic papers took advantage of the Know-Nothing‘s
gubernatorial candidate by pointing out that Derbigny‘s own father, as a native of France who
began his political career shortly after arriving from that country to Louisiana in 1797, would not
have been eligible for his political career under Know-Nothing naturalization proposals.
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Democrats beat the Know-Nothings at their own game in the North during that 1855 election by
providing a ticket that was, by its makeup but not by its ideology, more friendly to locallyminded nativists.117
The Know-Nothings never regained the level of popularity in the northern parts of the
state that they held before the state election. By the 1856 presidential election, the party had
already lost several of the parishes that had voted for the American candidate for Congress in
1855. Catahoula, East Baton Rouge, Rapides, and West Feliciana had American majorities in the
1855 elections, but voted for Buchanan in the 1856 presidential race. Of the six parishes that had
voted for Fillmore in 1856, four of them had done so with much smaller margins than they had in
1855. In Madison Parish, the American majority dropped from 66 to just 19 votes; in Concordia,
it dropped from 93 to 20 votes; in St. Tammany, it dropped from 251 to 77; and in Morehouse,
the vote dropped from 97 to 19 votes. In St. Helena, the American party lead increased
minimally from a 16 vote majority in 1855 to a 23 vote majority in 1856 (though it should be
noted that the overall votes for the American candidate decreased, but the Democrat‘s decrease
was greater), and in Caddo, the differential had increased from 28 in 1855 to 35 in 1856.The
parishes that had voted Democrat in 1855 almost universally did so with bigger margins in
1856.118
The Know-Nothing party began its slow decline in the Florida Parishes and in North
Louisiana because it became more entrenched in New Orleans. The party lost its newness and
intrigue after the state election. Residents in the northern parts of the state could no longer
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pretend that the party could help the northern parts of the state oppose New Orleans as the party
entrenched itself in that city. The Americans had become stronger than ever in New Orleans for
the 1856 presidential election. Through votes and violence, the party had won by landslides in
first, second, third, and fourth districts of New Orleans as well as Jefferson Parish. To make
matters worse, the national party had been crumbling since the convention to nominate their
presidential candidate after the Northern wing of the party left to join the Republicans, leaving
the Know-Nothings popular in just a few slave states. By the time of the presidential election, the
American Party in North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes had gone from being a vehicle by
which to oppose the New Orleans political structure while having the backing of a national party
to being a regional party dominated by the New Orleans political infrastructure.119
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Aftermath and Conclusion
The presidential election in 1856 proved to both Know-Nothings and Democrats in
Louisiana that the nation needed to address the question of slavery‘s expansion and the growing
sectional divide. Just days after Buchanan had clinched the presidency, West Baton Rouge
Democratic newspaper, The Sugar Planter, opined, ―the election of Mr. Buchanan will not work
a termination of the slavery agitation. It was never believed that it would; it will only postpone
the solution of a great problem, the permanency of the federal union.‖ New Orleans KnowNothing paper, the Daily Crescent declared that, ―our enemies—for they are our countrymen
only in name—are already laying their plans for the conduct of the next Presidential campaign,
by preparing for the struggles which will take place in the free states during the intermediate
time…the organs of freesoilism seek to keep up an unhealthy and unpatriotic agitation which can
only result in dissolution of the Union at no distant day.‖ The Fillmore vote highlighted the
growing sectional divide; while he gained 44 percent of the vote in the South, Fillmore won just
13 percent in the North. Most of the Northern Know-Nothings had bolted from the party to the
Republicans and a Northern offshoot of the Know-Nothings that had supported Republican
candidates. After 1856, the Know-Nothings were finished as a national party.120
The Know-Nothings in Louisiana did not disappear overnight or peacefully. Many of the
American Party voters had abandoned party support for the Democrats by the 1857 elections, but
some remained. Leading up to the 1857 state election, the Know-Nothings—by that time mostly
old line Whigs who still refused to integrate with the Democrats—had all but abandoned
nativism. The party instead focused on attacking their opponents with charges that the Louisiana
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Democrats had allied with Northern Democrats who were less than friendly to slavery. Even
after they lost badly in the 1857 elections, Know-Nothings continued to be a force in New
Orleans, where the party increasingly relied on violence to suppress the Democratic vote.
American Party candidate Gerald Stith won the mayoral race in 1858 by 130 votes amidst a riot
that tore New Orleans apart for weeks. The city remained the sole holdout for the American
Party in Louisiana, but it stuck around until the Union Army assigned their own government in
the city in 1862.121
The American Party in Louisiana nominated candidates for elections for seven years—at
least in name—but outside of New Orleans, the party had nearly vanished within four years. By
1857, Americans no longer competed with Democrats anywhere outside of New Orleans. The
state election that year was so bad for the Americans that they could not even defeat a split
Democratic Party, with two candidates, in the Third Congressional District. The two Democratic
candidates combined for nearly twice the American candidate‘s votes. In the Fourth District‘s
congressional race, the Democrat received 80 percent more votes than the American candidate.
As the Americans faded in to obsolescence, ―Opposition‖ or ―New Line Democrats‖ replaced
them as the primary oppositional party to the mainstream Democrats in Louisiana. The KnowNothings never again had widespread appeal in the state.122
During its brief existence, the American Party gained such national and multi-regional
popularity because the party adapted to fill the political needs of constituents. Michael Holt
described the Know-Nothing party as an anti-foreign and anti-Catholic reform party that
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culminated from the ―revolt against politics as usual as usual that had appeared in 1852 and
1853.‖ The party did not initially have a unifying program or stance on other issues, nor did it
dictate the level to which their anti-Catholicism or anti-foreignism should be central to the party.
The group spread far and wide before the party convened to decide a platform. When the party
finally held conventions, their inability to reach a consensus on slavery‘s expansion—their battle
over supporting a restoration of the Missouri Compromise and their fight over Millard Fillmore‘s
nomination served as a proxy for this—caused the party to splinter and fall apart. Only when the
Americans tried to unify their party did their party lose support.123
Louisiana‘s Know-Nothing party acted like a microcosm of the national party in that
Americans in different parts of the state valued different aspects of the party and manipulated the
party to fit their needs. The party expanded across the state in 1854 and 1855, rising from nonexistence to winning one US congressional district, several state senate and congressional seats,
and near countless municipal positions in all regions of the state. When the party convened in
Baton Rouge to decide their state ticket for the 1855 election, the party began to splinter along
regional lines. Shortly thereafter the party retracted until it existed as New-Orleans specific
party, and grew to irrelevance in the rest of the state. As a microcosm of the nation, the KnowNothings of Louisiana serve as an invaluable model to understand how political movements
expanded and contracted in the antebellum era.
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